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Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry
NELSON TEBBE*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court announced a controversial neutrality rule for
the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith.' Native
Americans had claimed an exemption from the drug laws so that they
could use peyote, a hallucinogen, in sacred rites. Under existing
precedent, their claim would have triggered strict scrutiny, requiring the
government to show that it had a compelling interest that justified
applying the drug laws to the ritual use of peyote.' But Smith put an end
to the compelling interest test for the vast majority of free exercise
claims. Strict scrutiny now would apply only to laws that had the purpose
of discriminating on the basis of religion. Neutrality made Smith itself an
easy case because the drug laws were not aimed at religion.3 The
neutrality regime announced in Smith has governed free exercise cases
ever since.
Criticism of Smith was intense and widespread. Academics,4
6Justices,5 and a bipartisan majority of Congress noisily denounced thedecision. Critics of Smith generally have made two normative arguments.
* Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Lawyering Program. B.A.,
Brown University; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D. Candidate, University of Chicago. Thanks to Bruce
Ackerman, Noah Feldman, Carolyn Frantz, Barry Friedman, David Gans, Abner Greene, R. Craig
Greene, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Heidi Kitrosser, Anita Krishnakumar, Douglas Laycock,
William Nelson, Richard Primus, Christopher Serkin, David Zaring, and participants in the NYU
Lawyering Faculty Colloquium and the NYU Legal History Colloquium.
i. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (I99O).
2. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,403 (1963).
3. Incidentally, Congress did not think the issue so straightforward and it overturned the result
in Smith by legalizing use of the drug in Native American rituals. 42 U.S.C. §§ i996a-b (2oo0). Many
states have likewise exempted the religious use of peyote from their drug laws. See Smith, 494 U.S. at
89o (listing state statutes).
4. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Cr. REV. I [hereinafter
Laycock, Remnants]; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
Cmi. L. REV. IIO9, I I i (199o) [hereinafter McConnell, Revisionism].
5. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 891-9o7 (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
JJ., concurring in the judgment); id. at 907-21 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb (2000) (criticizing Smith explicitly).
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First, they have objected that Smith leaves too much leeway for pervasive
welfare-state regulation to burden religion while satisfying neutrality.7
After all, laws not aimed at religion can hinder observance just as
effectively as those that target religion. Second and related, critics of
Smith have worried about religious minorities, who can suffer
disproportionately from laws that enact majoritarian mores.8 Arguably
the drug laws unwittingly burdened a religious minority in just this way.
These two normative arguments have driven much of the critical
literature on Smith.
Curiously, the leading critics of Smith have not directed these
arguments against neutrality itself. Instead, they think the Court has
selected the wrong sort of neutrality rule.
The critics9 have coined terms for two types of neutrality that have
become commonplace in the literature. Neutrality can be defined
generally as government evenhandedness toward private competition
and choice. I° But that basic definition allows for (at least) two more
specific meanings. First, formal neutrality, the principle of Smith, protects
against government policies that have the purpose of disfavoring religion.
Second, substantive neutrality, the critics' proposal, prohibits laws that
have the effect of disadvantaging a particular religious group (or religion
generally) regardless of whether they have a neutral purpose. For
example, the controlled substance laws at issue in Smith may well have
violated substantive neutrality, even though their purpose had nothing to
do with religion, because they had the effect of disfavoring Native
Americans who used peyote in rituals. So while Smith's rule-formal
neutrality-insufficiently protects religious practice, substantive
neutrality ensures that free exercise is not incidentally disfavored. The
critics think neutrality can be rehabilitated in this way.
Thus, although the Court and its academic critics bitterly dispute the
7. See, e.g., Laycock, Remnants, supra note 4, at 38. For additional sources see infra note 40.
8. See, e.g., McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1152. For additional sources see infra note
41.
9. By the critics I mean a loose school of scholars who oppose Smith. The most prominent critics
are Douglas Laycock and Michael McConnell. The critics usually share the two normative objections
to Smith described above and they generally propose a neutrality-based alternative. See, e.g., Thomas
C. Berg, Why A State Exclusion of Religious Schools From School Choice Programs Is
Unconstitutional, 2 FIRsT AM. L. REV. 23, 32, 34 (2003) [hereinafter Berg, Religious Schools] (endorsing
substantive neutrality); Stephen V. Monsma, Substantive Neutrality as a Basis for Free Exercise-No
Establishment Common Ground, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 13, 13 (200o); Carl E. Esbeck, A Constitutional
Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 26
(1997); Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993
BYU L. REV. 7, 51 (endorsing "substantive equality"); see also Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free
Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 2o HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 261 (I99I) (endorsing
"[nleutrality of effect").
1o. In the context of religion, that usually means government impartiality both among religions
and between religion and irreligion.
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outcomes of many cases, they agree on what it is they are arguing about.
Their dispute is between two versions of neutrality.
Dissenting opinion on the Court likewise focuses on neutrality. In
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the majority
approved and applied the formal neutrality rule of Smith." Writing
separately, Justice Souter questioned current doctrine and suggested that
the critics' rule of substantive neutrality might be preferable.'" Today, the
Court may be moving away from Smith.'3 And substantive neutrality is
the leading alternative to Smith on the Court as well as in the academic
literature.'4
This Article argues that neutrality of any stripe will insufficiently
protect free exercise. Substantive neutrality, the critics' proposal, suffers
from a conceptual difficulty that this Article calls the problem of
symmetry. As a consequence, substantive neutrality cannot deliver the
practical results that the critics envision.
Symmetry is the core conceptual feature of all neutrality rules.
Recall that neutrality means government evenhandedness toward private
competition and choice. Applied to religion, symmetry requires that
neutrality rules apply in the same way to laws that benefit religion as
they do to laws that burden it. Neutralists could not apply a very strict
rule, substantive neutrality, to laws that burden religion but only a more
permissive rule, formal neutrality, to laws that benefit religion. That
regime would not be neutral. It would systematically advantage religion
by, on one side, invalidating all laws that had the mere effect of
burdening religion, while, on the other side, banning only laws that had
the purpose of benefiting religion. An asymmetrical system like that
would not be neutral in any meaningful sense. In order to be consistent,
then, the critics would have to apply substantive neutrality in both
directions and reject laws that have the effect of favoring religion.
ii. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (Lukumi), 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(993) (using the term "[n]eutrality" to describe the rule of Smith); id. at 562 (Souter, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("Though Smith used the term 'neutrality' without a modifier,
the rule it announced plainly assumes that free-exercise neutrality is of the formal sort.").
12. Id. at 576 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Cf. Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 869, 9oi & n.I9 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (interpreting the Establishment
Clause to require neutrality of effect). Justice Souter interpreted the dissenters in Smith to be
advocating substantive neutrality without using the term. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 562. Whether that
characterization was correct is less interesting than what it reveals about how the debate is cast by
Smith's critics on the Court.
13. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (assessing a non-neutral state policy without
mentioning Smith). For a more detailed discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 127-133.
14. Justice O'Connor may be an exception to the consensus on neutrality, although she herself
has not written on the matter. In Lukumi she signed an opinion by Justice Blackmun, who wrote that
free exercise is "an affirmative individual liberty" and objected to "treat[ing] the Free Exercise Clause
as no more than an antidiscrimination principle." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 578 (Blackmun, J., joined by
O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Yet prohibiting all laws that have the effect of advantaging religion
would pose a serious problem for the critics. In theory, the critics
acknowledge that substantive neutrality must ban laws that both favor
and disfavor religion. But in practice, many of their concrete solutions
would have the effect of benefiting religion. Specifically, the critics often
rely on religious exemptions in order to remedy the non-neutral effects
of general laws. Many of those exemptions will advantage religion
relative to comparable secular commitments. Religious exemptions that
benefit religion in this way will violate substantive neutrality once that
rule is applied evenhandedly. The critics have not squarely faced that
difficulty. 5
One way of framing the problem is to say that substantive neutrality
has intrinsic implications for the Establishment Clause. If substantive
neutrality were applied symmetrically, as it must be, it would prohibit
laws and policies that had the effect of benefiting religion, regardless of
whether that was their object. It makes sense to think of a rule that
prohibits certain benefits toward religion as implementing an
antiestablishment norm. But such a strict reading of antiestablishment
would cut against common conceptions of what the Constitution should
require.
Consider for example the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA).'6 RLUIPA requires strict scrutiny-as a
statutory matter-of substantial government burdens on religion in the
context of prisons and certain land uses. The critics must strongly support
RLUIPA because it protects religion against burdens on observance
even where the restrictive law at issue is purposefully neutral." An
inmate who sued to receive halaal or kosher food would get the benefit
of strict scrutiny, even though the prison dietary rules were not designed
with religion in mind.
The trouble is that RLUIPA has the effect of advantaging religion
and therefore is not substantively neutral. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, a case
15. Only one piece has hinted at the argument of this Article. Douglas Laycock once argued that
free exercise includes a liberty component. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 313, 319 (1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty]. But
Laycock went on to argue that his neutrality rule could fully protect the liberty aspect of the Clause.
See id. at 320 ("Government must be [substantively] neutral so that religious belief and practice can be
free."); id. at 319-20 (arguing that liberty is protected by a rule of substantive neutrality). This Article
therefore makes an original contribution to the literature by introducing a fully elaborated conception
of substantive liberty.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200occ-2000cc-5 (2000).
17. RLUIPA is a successor to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Congress passed
RFRA explicitly out of disagreement with Smith. See 42 U.S.C. § 200obb (2000) (articulating the
purpose of RFRA as restoring the compelling interest test in the wake of Smith). RLUIPA passed
after the Supreme Court struck down portions of RFRA. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1998) (holding that Congress lacks power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enact RFRA as against the states).
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currently pending before the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit held that
RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause because it advantages
religion over comparable secular beliefs. Under RLUIPA, the court
reasoned, burdens on free exercise would draw strict scrutiny, while
burdens on other constitutional rights would be reviewed only for
rationality in the prison context. That disparity has the effect of
advantaging religion over irreligion. To use the critics' terms (though the
court did not), RLUIPA violates substantive neutrality. This does not
mean that RLUIPA should be struck down-in fact it should not 2 -but
it does mean that substantive neutrality would require that result.
This tension between the symmetry constraint and the critics'
practical solutions is widespread. Many religious exemptions will
incidentally advantage religion just as RLUIPA does. The Act therefore
illustrates how the problem of symmetry frustrates the critics' effort to
combat Smith from within the neutrality paradigm. Substantive
neutrality would prohibit RLUIPA and many other religious exemptions
that are central to the critics' project. Neutrality alone therefore cannot
provide an account of the Free Exercise Clause that yields attractive
outcomes in practice.
Fortunately, neutrality is not the only possible principle for the Free
Exercise Clause. A liberty approach differs from neutrality and offers
distinct advantages. Liberty is asymmetrical-it protects religious
practice regardless of whether doing so incidentally advantages religion.
This Article proposes a liberty rule, describes how it would work, and
defends it against likely objections. Liberty diverges from the critics'
proposal in significant ways. Chiefly, it does not suffer from the problem
of symmetry. Liberty can be defined as the ability of private parties to
pursue their interests, free of government interference or burden. That
definition carries no inherent implications for state actions that benefit
religion. A liberty approach is therefore free to reach results in real cases
that more closely match the critics' vision.
Liberty not only is easier to defend; it also better captures the
affirmative value of free exercise. Liberty of conscience matters in the
U.S. constitutional tradition for many reasons, perhaps most of all
because it recognizes the intrinsic value of developing and pursuing a
comprehensive conception of the good.' A liberty rule therefore asks the
i8. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 268-69 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 308 (2004).
Cf Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding RLUIPA); Charles v. Verhagen, 348
F.3d 6oi, 611 (7th Cir. 2oo3) (same); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1O62, 1o68 (9th Cir. 2oo2)
(same).
19. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265; see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (asking only whether
burdens on constitutional rights in prison are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests").
20. See discussion infra Part II.D.
21. See Martha C. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in SUSAN MOLLER OKIN ET AL., IS
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right question: not whether a challenged law disfavors religion relative to
other commitments, but rather whether it burdens the free exercise of
religion.
Consider an example that illustrates the difference between liberty
and neutrality. The Newark Police Department instituted a policy that
officers could not wear beards.22 Muslim police officers objected that the
policy prevented them from observing their faith. Under the Smith rule,
the officers should have lost their case because the beard ban did not
purposefully target religion. That outcome would have protected free
exercise insufficiently. The trouble is that the critics' rule of substantive
neutrality would not have produced a better outcome. Allowing only
Muslim officers to wear beards would have advantaged them relative to
officers who wanted to stop shaving for aesthetic or political reasons.
That result would not have been neutral because it would have favored
religion over irreligion. In fact, the Third Circuit did hold for the officers
in the Newark case. 3 A liberty rationale best accounts for that outcome.
The beard policy properly triggered heightened constitutional concern
simply because it substantially burdened Muslim officers. And they
probably should have prevailed because the city's interest in uniformity
was relatively weak.
But liberty should not serve as the only free exercise norm. Imagine
a government proclamation that carried no sanctions but simply
declared, "this is not a Muslim nation." Government discrimination like
that would not significantly burden liberty but it likely would violate the
Constitution. Formal neutrality prohibits exactly that sort of purposive
bias and consequently it enjoys widespread support from all parties to
the current debate. Two independent principles therefore should protect
free exercise: liberty and formal neutrality. Violating either one would
trigger heightened scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, however, is probably
inappropriate for the liberty component. One lesson of the Court's
experience prior to Smith is that strict scrutiny protects too much. A
MULTUCULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 105, I07-O8 (Joshua Cohen et al, eds., 1999); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 8I (1999); cf. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1982) (arguing that the speech clause serves an intrinsic value, "individual self-
realization"). Even if religious conceptions of the good were not intrinsically valuable, government
would still want to protect freedom of religion out of respect for the choices that citizens actually
make. See Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, supra, at 21. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 205- I (1971) (defending liberty of conscience from the perspective of justice as fairness).
22. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 17o F.3d 359 (3 d Cir.
1999).
23. The court ruled for the officers using an obscure exception to Smith. See id. at 362. Its holding
does not make sense under any sort of neutrality rule. For a fuller discussion of the case, see infra text
accompanying notes 157-164.
24. See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:
Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, i8 HARV. L. REV. 155, 201 (2004) [hereinafter
Laycock, Theology Scholarships] (discussing the era before Smith and noting that "many
[VOL. 56:699
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more appropriate standard would be closer to intermediate scrutiny or
the balancing approach that the Court has developed in its recent privacy
cases: 5 Any substantial burden on religious practice must be justified by
a state interest that is important enough to outweigh the practitioner's
interest in observance. That test introduces its own difficulties, but its
problems are preferable to the more serious drawbacks of substantive
neutrality.
Part I defines substantive neutrality and explains its features. It then
critiques substantive neutrality by arguing that it suffers from the
problem of symmetry, which defeats many of the critics' core practical
solutions. Part II argues for a particular type of liberty principle, which it
calls substantive liberty. It defines substantive liberty, describes how it
would work, and defends it against several anticipated objections,
including the objection that liberty too runs afoul of the Establishment
Clause. Although this Article does not offer a theory of
antiestablishment, it takes a preliminary look and suggests that in fact the
Establishment Clause leaves ample room for a liberty component of the
Free Exercise Clause. The Article then concludes that critics of Smith,
both on the Court and among commentators, are mistaken to think that
neutrality can be refurbished. Neutrality alone cannot vindicate the
vision of free exercise that the critics themselves rightly cherish. That
vision requires liberty.
I. AGAINST NEUTRALITY
This Part describes and critiques substantive neutrality. The first
section defines substantive neutrality and distinguishes it from other
types of neutrality. Section B then makes the central argument of this
Part, namely that substantive neutrality cannot vindicate the critics' own
vision for the Free Exercise Clause because of the problem of symmetry.
Two real-world examples show how symmetry frustrates the critics'
aspirations: RLUIPA, mentioned above, and Sherbert, a key precedent
for the critics. Finally, Section C mentions a more general difficulty, one
that religion-clause neutrality shares with virtually all neutrality rules,
namely the problem of baselines.
A. FACIAL, FORMAL, AND SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRALITY
Neutrality can be defined as government evenhandedness toward
private competition and choice. Regarding religion, neutrality prevents
government from advantaging or disadvantaging a particular faith (or
commentators thought the compelling interest test was relaxed in some of the cases that the
government won").
25. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The Texas [sodomy] statute furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.").
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religion generally). As the Smith Court said, government may not "lend
its power to one or the other side in controversies over religio[n].
To take an extreme example, lawmakers could not criminalize the
celebration of Roman Catholic mass consistent with neutrality. Of course
that law would violate liberty as well. But neutrality focuses on the fact
that banning mass would disfavor Catholicism relative to other faiths and
secularism.
This definition-government evenhandedness toward private
choice-applies to all types of neutrality. Three specific sorts of
neutrality appear in the cases: facial, formal, and substantive. Substantive
neutrality is the most important here, but that term is difficult to explain
without first briefly defining facial and formal neutrality.
I. Facial neutrality
Facial neutrality prevents the government from explicitly disfavoring
religion.27 For instance, facial neutrality would support the result in
McDaniel v. Paty, where the Court invalidated Tennessee laws
disqualifying ministers from holding certain state offices." Those laws
contravened facial neutrality because they employed a religious
category--ministers--on their face.29  Philip Kurland articulated the
classic defense of facial neutrality, which he called the rule against
religious classifications.3" Some justices likewise have argued that
26. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Equal Regard,
in LAW & RELIGION 200, 214 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) (endorsing a definition of neutrality
under which "government must not favor some individuals over others on the basis of their religious
viewpoint").
27. Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (Lukumi), 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) ("[T]he minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law
lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the
language or context."). There is some confusion of terminology among courts and commentators here.
Laycock, for instance, does not employ the distinction between facial and formal neutrality. Cf.
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L.
REv. 993,999 (I99o) [hereinafter Laycock, Neutrality].
Facial neutrality approximates what the Court sometimes calls general applicability. See Lukumi,
508 U.S. at 531 ("Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated .... "); see also id. at 557 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he terms [neutrality and general
applicability] are not only 'interrelated' but substantially overlap."). While it is possible to imagine a
law that, although generally applicable without respect to religion, nevertheless employed a religious
classification, say in its preamble alone, it is hard to see how this distinction could amount to a real
difference.
28. 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978).
29. See id. at 621 n.I ("'Whereas Ministers of the Gospel are by their profession, dedicated to
God and the care of Souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their functions;
therefore, no Minister of the Gospel, or priest of any denomination whatever, shall be eligible to a seat
in either House of the Legislature."' (quoting Tenn. Const., art. VIII, § 1 (1796)). A state statute
adopted the same restrictions for delegates to a state constitutional convention. See id. at 621
(referencing Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 848, § 4 (1976)).
30. "The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a single precept: that
government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read
[Vol. 56:699
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religious classifications should be automatically invalidated, though that
view has never prevailed.3
Many have rejected a simple rule of facial neutrality because that
type of ban, although categorical, provides only limited protection.
Congress could, consistent with facial neutrality, pass a law that had both
the aim and the actual effect of singling out a particular creed for
unfavorable treatment, so long as the law applied generally to everyone
within a religion-neutral category. For example, the Lukumi Court went
beyond facial neutrality. There, the Court invalidated Florida ordinances
that prohibited certain killing of animals. The ordinances did not name
Santeria, a religion that requires ritual animal sacrifice.32 Nevertheless,
the Court figured that the laws were so riddled with exceptions that they
had the impermissible object of suppressing religious observance. If
facial neutrality had been the only rule, the Florida ordinances might
well have withstood constitutional challenge.3 Contemporary courts and
commentators realize that facial neutrality cannot suffice, and they
therefore seldom argue that free exercise should protect only against
religious classifications. 4 The Supreme Court has explained that the Free
together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or
impose a burden." PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE
SUPREME COURT I12 (1962); see also Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court":
Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. Cr. REV. 373 (embracing Kurland's proposal).
31. See, e.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 579 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("When a law discriminates against religion as such ... it automatically will fail strict
scrutiny .... ); McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 631-32 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Whether or
not the provision discriminates among religions.., it establishes a religious classification-
involvement in protected religious activity-governing the eligibility for office, which I believe is
absolutely prohibited.").
32. See Lukumi, 5o8 U.S. at 533-34 (ruling that the claim of facial discrimination was "not
conclusive").
33. Another example of facial neutrality's failings is the ban on polygamy that was upheld in
Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145, I68 (1878). Anti-polygamy statutes were designed to target
Mormons, even though they applied on their face to all polygamists. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in
American Public Law, io6 YALE L.J. 241I, 2428 (1997) ("[Anti-Mormon laws] were enacted with the
intention, and had the effect, of suppressing a religion, which violates the Free Exercise Clause under
post-x99o caselaw.").
34. Facial neutrality might not only be under-protective, but also over-protective. The Court does
not seem to think that the mere use of religious classifications always warrants special concern,
independent of their purpose or even if they work to benefit religion. For instance, the Court has
never suggested that legislative exemptions for religion are specially suspect simply because they
employ religious classifications. See, e.g., Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (upholding Title VII's religion exemption). This contrasts with affirmative action
cases, where the Court sometimes suggests that racial classifications raise special concern because
departing from race-blindness can cause social harm. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 3o6, 325-27
(2003); Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution, 5t DUKE L.J. 289, 302-03 (2oo0 ) (discussing
racial classifications). Religion, unlike race, is not generally considered to be so fraught that its mere
classification could have pernicious unintended consequences. Facial neutrality for religion-4f it has
any place in the Court's jurisprudence-is probably best considered a tool to exhume illegitimate
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Exercise Clause protects against hostility "masked as well as overt."35
2. Formal neutrality
Formal neutrality goes further and prohibits official action whose
purpose is to discourage a particular faith (or belief in general), even if
that object is not manifest on the policy's face., 6 It was this sort of
evenhandedness -formal neutrality-that the Smith Court adopted and
that now stands as the measure of constitutional protection under the
Free Exercise Clause.37 In Lukumi, again, the Court confirmed that
interpretation and held that the Florida ordinances violated neutrality
because their object was to interfere with the ritual sacrifices of Santeria,
even though they did not explicitly target that sect.
3s
Virtually everyone agrees that formal neutrality as to religion is a
good thing-i.e., that purposive government discrimination is
objectionable.39 According to both sides of the current debate, the state
should not aim to single out religionists for unfavorable treatment. This
Article does not challenge that consensus.
purposes or effects.
35. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.
Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the object of a law
is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not
neutral; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored
to advance that interest.
Id. at 533 (citations omitted)).
36. Cf. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 562 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("While facial neutrality would permit discovery of a law's object or purpose only by
analysis of the law's words, structure, and operation, formal neutrality would permit enquiry also into
the intentions of those who enacted the law."). Some Justices object that formal neutrality properly
examines not the actual subjective intent of legislators, but instead the objective purpose or object of
the resulting legislation. See id. at 558 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
37. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 ("Facial neutrality is not determinative.... Official action that
targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the
requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against government hostility which
is masked as well as overt."); id. at 562 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("Though Smith used the term 'neutrality' without a modifier, the rule it announced plainly assumes
that free-exercise neutrality is of the formal sort."). Laycock and McConnell agree that Smith
articulated a rule of formal neutrality, though they do not always distinguish between facial and formal
neutrality. See Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at iooo; McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at
1153.
38. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534-35.
39. "At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue ...
regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons." Id. at 532; see also id. at
563 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (calling it a "noncontroversial
principle" that "formal neutrality" is a necessary element of free exercise, though it may not be
sufficient); Eisgruber & Sager, Equal Regard, supra note 26, at 205 (calling it "common ground" that
the state cannot punish or deny benefits on account of religious beliefs); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 140 (1986). Probably Laycock would agree that formal neutrality
provides a necessary minimum of constitutional protection for religion. Cf. Laycock, Neutrality, supra
note 27, at root (arguing that to exclude religious schools from an otherwise-neutral aid program
would violate formal neutrality).
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The central question is whether formal neutrality is sufficient. Recall
that the critics direct two normative arguments against Smith. First, they
worry that Smith leaves far too much leeway for widespread state
regulation to harm sacred practices while satisfying--or under the guise
of-formal neutrality.' Second and related, critics assail Smith for
neglecting religious minorities, whose practices may suffer from innocent
laws that enact majority mores.4 The Smith Court itself recognized that
many religious practices would be placed "at a relative disadvantage"
under its rule, but it expressed a hope that formal neutrality's
shortcomings would be mitigated by the legislature, which could exempt
religious minorities from burdensome laws of general applicability.4
Critics of Smith think that formal neutrality should serve not as the
sole rule, but only as a minimum baseline of constitutional protection. In
other words, the critics agree with the Court that government should not
purposefully discriminate against religion, but they disagree with the
Court that this rule alone ought to protect free exercise. This Article
does not revisit that familiar debate. It joins the conversation at the point
where the critics propose a solution: substantive neutrality.
40. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 578 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Free Exercise "ought not be construed to cover only the
extreme and hypothetical situation in which a State directly targets a religious practice"); id. at 9oi
("There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability or general criminal
prohibitions, for laws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or
intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion."). Laycock puts the point
this way:
[Tihe obvious forms of persecution are not the ones a contemporary American majority is
likely to use. The scope of regulation in the modern administrative state creates ample
opportunity for facially neutral religious oppression. Such oppressive laws may be enacted
through hostility, sheer indifference, or ignorance of minority faiths. If the Court intends to
defer to any formally neutral law restricting religion, then it has created a legal framework
for persecution, and persecutions will result.
Laycock, Remnants, supra note 4, at 4. See also Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty at the End of the
Century, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 187, 191 (2001) [hereinafter Berg, End of the Century]; Stephen L. Carter,
The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, IO7 HARV. L. REV. 118, 129-30 (1993); Laycock, Remnants,
supra note 4, at 38; Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at lOO6; Monsma, supra note 9, at 25; James D.
Gordon, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 107-08 (1991).
41. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. at 398, 411 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[Miany people hold beliefs alien to the
majority of our society-beliefs that are protected by the First Amendment but which could easily be
trod upon under the guise of 'police' or 'health' regulations reflecting the majority's views."); see also
Carter, supra note 40, at 122-23; Gordon, supra note 40, at io8; Monsma, supra note 9, at 24;
Eisgruber & Sager, Equal Regard, supra note 26, at 204 ("[G]overnment is obliged to treat the deep
religious commitments of members of minority religious faiths with the same regard as it treats the
deep commitments of other members of the society."); McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1153
("[Glenuine neutrality toward minority religions is preferable to a mere formal neutrality, which can
be expected to reflect the moral and religious presuppositions of the majority.").
42. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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3. Substantive neutrality
Substantive neutrality requires, in addition to an impartial purpose,
a neutral effect. Government policies may not create effects that favor or
disfavor religion.43 Laycock, who coined the term, defines it this way:
By substantive neutrality, I mean that government should "minimize
the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief
or disbelief, practice or non-practice, observance or nonobservance.""
For example, the ban on peyote at issue in Smith, although part of a
general criminalization of hallucinogens not aimed at religious practice,
may have violated substantive neutrality because it had the effect of
disadvantaging a central sacrament for certain Native American faiths.
Where state policies incidentally discourage religion, substantive
neutrality calls for heightened scrutiny.4" If the government fails to justify
its actions, then the court may carve out a religious exemption in order to
remedy the non-neutral effect. For instance, exempting the ritual use of
peyote from the drug laws arguably would, to use Justice Brennan's
words, "reflect nothing more than the governmental obligation of
neutrality in the face of religious difference." 6
43. See, e.g., Michael McConnell & Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 35 (1989) ("[A] regulation is not neutral in an economic sense
if, whatever its normal scope or its intentions, it arbitrarily imposes greater costs on religious than
comparable nonreligious activities.").
44. Laycock, Remnants, supra note 4, at 16 (quoting Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at iooi).
See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 24, at i6o ("I have long argued that government
should be substantively neutral toward religion."); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 562 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[Slubstantive neutrality ... , in addition to
demanding a secular object, would generally require government to accommodate religious
differences by exempting religious practices from formally neutral laws." (citing Laycock, Neutrality,
supra note 27.)).
Some scholars endorse substantive neutrality without using the term. See Bradley, supra note 9,
at 261 ("[Religious liberty is] defined as what happens when government provides no reason to
practice or adopt any particular religious perspective. 'Neutrality of effect' is a convenient expression
for this objective."); McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1146 ("The purpose of free exercise
exemptions is to ensure that incentives to practice a religion are not adversely affected by government
action."); McConnell & Posner, supra note 43, at 34 ("[I]t may be impermissible to regulate churches
and religiously motivated conduct, even under formally neutral criteria, in ways that have a
substantially greater impact on religious exercise than on other activities."); Pepper, supra note 9, at 51
("substantive equality").
45. The critics seldom acknowledge that substantive neutrality requires a balancing test, but this
must be the case. Substantive neutrality cannot be absolute. For example, no exemption would be
allowed for ritual human sacrifice even though the laws against murder have the incidental effect of
prohibiting that practice. Realizing this, the critics occasionally say that their rule involves some sort of
balancing. See Laycock, Remnants, supra note 4, at 30 ("A right to religious exemptions cannot be
absolute; the state must be able to override it for sufficiently compelling reasons."); McConnell,
Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1148-49 (acknowledging that in certain cases courts must determine
whether government interests are important enough to override religious needs).
46. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409. Justice Brennan also seemed to advocate substantive neutrality in
his dissent in Goldman, where he argued that the military's formally neutral dress code effectively
disfavored Orthodox Jews who must wear a yarmulke. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 521
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Substantive neutrality works on the same fundamental intuition as
formal neutrality, namely that government should neither favor nor
disfavor religious practice.47 But it supplements that basic conviction with
the realization that pervasive welfare state regulation will more often
disadvantage religion inadvertently than through purposive
discrimination."' Laws in a welfare state do not often aim to disadvantage
religion, but they do often reach areas of life that affect believers.
Prohibition of alcohol, for instance, did not target religion but would
have contravened substantive neutrality had it not exempted Catholics
and Jews from using wine in the Eucharist or at Seders.49 To the critics, it
is not simply purposive government bias that offends the constitutional
tradition, but any state action that interferes with the principle that
"religion is to be left as wholly to private choice as anything can be.""
Violations of substantive neutrality do not depend on actually
altering behavior. Rather, government infringes substantive neutrality
whenever it skews private ordering by creating incentives toward or
against religion.' Critics have analogized their view of government
evenhandedness to economic neutrality. 52 Like economic incentives,
religious incentives might actually alter private choice only at the
margins, where other decision-making factors hang in relative equipoise.
In our example, the mass ban might prevent non-Catholics from joining
the church, or it might thwart lapsed Catholics from practicing their faith
more zealously, but only in marginal cases where the private citizen was
not already either fully committed to Catholicism or resolutely
uninterested. For the critics, the ban need not actually alter any private
decision in order to violate neutrality. It is the very existence of a state
incentive that constitutes a violation of substantive neutrality.3
Government can distort religious pluralism by altering incentives,
regardless of whether those incentives actually change behavior.
4. An aside: neutrality v. equality
Neutrality and equality both prohibit discrimination against religion,
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan blended this rationale, which focused on minority faiths, with a
concern for the liberty of all faiths. See id. at 521-22.
47. Perhaps substantive neutrality was designed to actually implement a liberty intuition using the
language of neutrality. See, e.g., Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 15, at 319, 320.
Regardless of whether that was the critics' motive, a neutrality test cannot implement a liberty
principle. For an assessment of this failure, see infra text accompanying notes 192-2o8.
48. See McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1133-35 (arguing that generally applicable laws
will often have non-neutral effects).
49. Cf id. at 1135; Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at Iooo.
5o. Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at 1002.
51. See id. ("[Religion] should proceed as unaffected by government as possible.").
52. See, e.g., supra note 43, at 35.
53. Cf. McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1146 ("The purpose of free exercise exemptions
is to ensure that incentives to practice a religion are not adversely affected by government action.").
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and thus they resemble each other. However, they are not identical. This
subsection draws a distinction between neutrality and equality for the
sake of clarity but ultimately concludes that little turns on it.
Accordingly, the remainder of the Article follows convention and refers
only to neutrality.
Recall that neutrality requires government evenhandedness toward
private competition and choice. Equality, by contrast, concerns not
private choice, but social status. With regard to religion, equality focuses
its attention on minority sects, protecting them against discrimination,
while neutrality focuses on private decision making. 4
Eisgruber and Sager have built a theory of the religion clauses
around an equality principle that they call equal regard. The central
conviction of equal regard is that "[w]hat properly motivates
constitutional solicitude for religious practices is their distinct
vulnerability to discrimination, not their distinct value."55 Equal regard
thus prohibits differential state treatment of religious groups. Purposive
discrimination is not necessary to make out a free exercise claim,
according to Eisgruber and Sager. Instead, a member of a minority faith
need only show that the government has accommodated some other
religious belief (or secularism) without similarly accommodating the
minority religion.: Equal regard therefore differs from substantive
neutrality insofar as it ignores whether a government policy skews
incentives. 7 Only when the state selectively accommodates some group
without accommodating minority faiths does the state run afoul of equal
regard. Treating religious groups differently is prohibited by equal regard
even when the difference does not alter incentives.
Consider a favorite example of Eisgruber and Sager, the Newark
case mentioned above. A police regulation prohibited all officers from
wearing beards. Muslim police officers challenged the beard ban on the
ground that their religion required them to grow their facial hair. The
Third Circuit held for the officers." Eisgruber and Sager applaud that
result, but only because of an additional fact: The police department
exempted officers who had medical conditions that prevented them from
54. The analytic difference between neutrality and equality sharpens when we consider them as
describing not negative rights, which prevent the government from taking certain action, but positive
rights, which command the government to do something affirmative. Neutrality, unlike equality, has
no positive component. While government may act affirmatively to promote equality among social
groups, it cannot take positive steps toward neutrality. Rectifying social bias would by definition make
the government less neutral, not more, because doing so would interfere with private preferences.
55. Eisgruber & Sager, Equal Regard, supra note 26, at 2Ol.
56. See id. at 21o.
57. See id. at 214.
58. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 17o F.3d 359 (3d Cir.
1999). As explained below, that holding relied on an exception to Smith and can only be explained by
a liberty rationale. See infra text accompanying notes 157-164.
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shaving.59 Eisgruber and Sager think that the department violated the
principle of equal regard because of this secular exemption. 
°
Accommodating secular needs but not religious ones offends the
Constitution.6'
Yet substantive neutrality would analyze the Newark case
differently from equal regard, and this divergence illustrates the
distinction between neutrality and equality. For equal regard, it is the
different recognition of secular and religious needs that generates the
constitutional complaint. If the secular medical exemption had not
existed, Muslim officers would have had no ground for complaint." For
substantive neutrality, on the other hand, the trouble is that the beard
ban disproportionately impacted Muslim officers. Neutralists would
worry that Newark's ban disfavored Muslim officers regardless of
whether it also included a secular exemption. Accommodating people
who must shave for medical reasons does not affect a neutrality analysis.
That is because the medical exemption did not impact private decision-
making for Muslims. Medical conditions are beyond choice, and a
government policy that treated them with special solicitude would not
skew private incentives. 6" Equal regard, by contrast, concerns status
independent of choice. Because the Newark policy exempted one group
without also accommodating religion, it violated equal regard.
For Eisgruber and Sager, the central imperative of the Free Exercise
Clause is to protect minority religious groups from political
59. Id. at 361.
6
o. See Eisgruber & Sager, Equal Regard, supra note 26, at 220 (discussing the Newark Lodge
case). At times it seems that equal regard protects only against purposive discrimination. Consonant
with this version, Eisgruber and Sager might think that Newark Lodge involved intentional
discrimination. But it is difficult to believe that a single medical exemption could establish purposive
discrimination on the basis of religion.
At other times, they think that free exercise should require an exemption for religion whenever
the government accommodates a secular concern, and not a religious one, even if it has overlooked
religion unintentionally. See id. at 220.
Even this second reading of equal regard seems problematic. Equal regard looks less attractive if
a single accommodation of a secular interest-and only some such anomaly like the medical exception
in Newark Lodge-triggers a duty on the part of government to accommodate religion. Equal regard
would not protect Muslim police officers in, say, Trenton from an identical regulation that did not
think in advance to accommodate officers with dermatological conditions. Why the ability of Muslim
officers to follow a commandment of their faith (without losing their jobs) should depend on the
normatively insignificant accident of a single secular exemption is difficult to understand.
61. See id. at 21D ("Legislatures can make otherwise valid general laws more or less absolute as
their democratic judgment dictates; but to the extent that variance from these laws is or would be
permitted to accommodate the discrete and opposing interests of some members of the political
community, equal regard insists that the same accommodation be made for the deep interests of
minority religious believers.").
62. See id. at 214 (rejecting the idea that government must take affirmative steps to "create a
regime equally hospitable to all belief systems").
63. This analysis puts aside the unlikely possibility that an officer would fraudulently claim to
have a skin condition simply in order to be able to grow a beard.
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discrimination,64 not to keep government out of private competition
among religions, as it is for neutralists. Eisgruber and Sager seem to
prefer the term equality to neutrality for precisely this reason. 6' In that
way, their theory of equal regard illustrates the distinction between
neutrality and equality.
Without mentioning this distinction, the free exercise literature
generally speaks solely in terms of neutrality. Since little turns on the
difference, this Article follows that convention.
B. THE PROBLEM OF SYMMETRY
Substantive neutrality suffers from a difficulty best called the
problem of symmetry. The trouble stems from the central conceptual
feature of neutrality, namely evenhandedness itself. Recall that
neutrality can be defined as government evenhandedness toward private
competition and choice. Every version of neutrality worthy of the name
must object equally to government favor and disfavor. Substantive
neutrality, in particular, must always apply as readily to official action
that has the effect of advantaging religion as it does to policy that
disadvantages it. The critics could not apply strict neutrality of effect to
laws that burden religion but only a more permissive purposive neutrality
to laws that benefit religion. That regime would not be neutral. Rather, it
would systematically benefit religion. The critics understand this
requirement of evenhandedness. Laycock's own definition of substantive
neutrality prohibits not only "discourage[ment]" of religion, but also and
equally "encourage [ment]."'
But in practice many of the critics' concrete recommendations will
have the effect of advantaging religion. The critics' core practical
solutions often feature religious exemptions. The trouble is that many of
these religious exemptions will not only remove a disincentive to
observance, but also and simultaneously encourage religiosity.
Government exemptions advance religion over irreligion whenever they
license only believers to engage in conduct that others would like to
undertake for secular reasons.67 Where religious duty coincides with
secular interest in this way, carving out a religious exemption from a
formally neutral law favors religion in violation of substantive neutrality.
Religious exemptions will often violate a properly symmetric application
6+ See id. at 201 ("What properly motivates constitutional solicitude for religious practices is
their distinct vulnerability to discrimination .... ).
65. See Eisgruber & Sager, Equal Regard, supra note 26, at 213-14 (rejecting the term neutrality
and preferring equal regard, which does not seek to avoid government actions that "influence the
extent to which various religious and secular beliefs flourish").
66. See text quoted, supra note 44.
67. See Berg, Religious Schools, supra note 9, at 35 (noting that an improper incentive to choose
religious conduct "will exist in cases where the exemption coincides substantially with self interest").
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of substantive neutrality.6
Symmetry thus presents a difficulty for the critics because they
strongly support many religious exemptions, both judicial and legislative,
that have the effect of advantaging religion over other faiths or over
comparable secular commitments. Not every exemption advances
religion. For instance, federal and state legislative exemptions from drug
laws for ritual use of peyote arguably do not favor Native Americans
because peyote is unpleasant to use and therefore has not generated
widespread secular demand. But many exemptions do favor observance.
An exemption from prohibition for the sacramental use of wine, for
instance, may well have had the effect of encouraging Catholicism.69 If it
were applied consistently and symmetrically, substantive neutrality
would prohibit many practical proposals for exemptions that are critical
to protecting free exercise.
One way of understanding the problem of symmetry is to say that
substantive neutrality under the Free Exercise Clause carries inherent
implications for the Establishment Clause.7" Antiestablishment mirrors
free exercise; it prohibits benefits to religion where free exercise
prohibits burdens. Evenhandedness, the central conceptual characteristic
of neutrality, means that a rule disallowing non-neutral effects under the
Free Exercise Clause must also ban non-neutral effects in the opposite
direction.7 It makes sense to think of a rule that regulates benefits
toward religion as implementing an antiestablishment norm.
Current Establishment Clause doctrine appears to exacerbate the
substantive neutrality's problem of symmetry. The Court's sometime
68. Some may object that formal neutrality likewise must be applied symmetrically and therefore
that it too prohibits exemptions that advantage religion. This objection is incorrect because statutory
and judicial exemptions are not designed to advantage religion. For a fuller discussion, see infra note
'37.
69. Sometimes the literature describes substantive neutrality as prohibiting incentives to practice
a particular faith. Laycock says that a religious exemption that coincides with self-interest might
persuade people that they honestly hold religious views consistent with that interest. The lure of the
incentive will create "cognitive dissonance" that the individual might resolve by taking up the
protected belief or practice. See Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at I017.
But it is important to realize that actual conversion to the favored faith is not necessary to trigger
the problem of symmetry. Recall that substantive neutrality bans government actions that disfavor
observance regardless of whether they actually alter behavior. See supra text accompanying notes 51-
53. This must be equally true for the Establishment Clause: incentives that benefit religion must
violate substantive neutrality independent of any actions they actually prompt.
70. Justice Stevens recognized this problem in his earliest free exercise opinion. See, e.g., United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263-64 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[l~f tax exemptions were
dispensed on religious grounds, every citizen would have an economic motivation to join the favored
sects.").
71. Growing numbers of constitutions in other countries protect religious liberty while rejecting
antiestablishment and the separation of church and state. Whether neutrality would make sense as a
norm in an asymmetrical system-one that protects against burdens on religion without prohibiting
benefits to religion-is a difficult issue that is best pursued separately.
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antiestablishment test, set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, ostensibly bars
(inter alia) government policies that have the principal effect of either
advancing or inhibiting religion." In other words, the Lemon test calls for
something close to substantive neutrality under the Establishment
Clause. 3
The most astute proponents of substantive neutrality have noticed
the problem of symmetry, though only in passing and without fully facing
its practical consequences. Two of the leading defenders of substantive
neutrality attempt to address that difficulty in different ways. First,
Douglas Laycock advocates a balancing test for substantive neutrality: A
court faced with two non-neutral alternatives, one that discourages and
another that encourages religion, should choose the course that creates
the smallest incentive in either direction.75 Courts should take "[t]he
course that most nearly approaches substantive neutrality- the course
that minimizes both encouragement and discouragement. '' 6 Where it is
impossible to determine which course would be less neutral, however,
courts should defer to the legislature and deny the free exercise claim.77
72. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(discussing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (97)). One circuit has formulated an incentive
test to determine whether legislative accommodations satisfy the Establishment Clause. The Eighth
Circuit approved a law that allows religious health care providers that meet certain criteria to obtain
Medicare benefits. The Court held that the appropriate test for an establishment is whether a
legislative accommodation merely removes an impediment or instead creates an affirmative incentive
to join a church. Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min de Parle, 212 F.3d Io84, 1095 (8th
Cir. 2000).
73. In actual fact, the Court does not normally invalidate exemptions that have the effect of
advancing religion-the Lemon test notwithstanding. Thousands of federal and state statutes exempt
religious practices from their provisions. It simply cannot be the case that these exemptions are
unconstitutional whenever they have the inadvertent effect of advantaging religion. For fuller
discussions, see infra text accompanying notes 92-95 and 224-233.
74. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 9, at 35 ("[Ijf the exemption of religiously motivated conduct
creates an incentive to choose that conduct over the secular alternatives, then [sic] exemption would
be improper under a choice analysis."); McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1146-47 ("[Tlhe
government is not required to create exemptions that would make religious believers better off
relative to others than they would be in the absence of the government program to which they object.
The purpose of free exercise exemptions is to ensure that incentives to practice a religion are not
adversely affected by government action. By the same token, government action should not have the
effect of creating incentives to practice religion."); McConnell & Posner, supra note 43, at 34 ("The
Free Exercise Clause is thus the mirror image of the Establishment Clause. Both clauses are best
interpreted from the standpoint of neutrality.").
75. Compare Laycock, Remnants, supra note 4, at 17 ("The magnitude of encouragement incident
to an exemption is generally smaller than the magnitude of discouragement incident to criminalization,
and so exemption comes closer to substantive neutrality."); with Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at
1017 (suggesting that in some cases "denying the exemption appears to be more nearly neutral than
granting it."); see also Monsma, supra note 9, at 30 (advocating minimizing favoring and disfavoring
religion).
76. Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at ioo3. This passage is specific to the example that
Laycock is discussing, the sacramental use of wine during prohibition, but it fairly characterizes his
general approach.
77. See id., at 1017 ("If we have no plausible estimate of which effect is larger, then there may be
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Second, Michael McConnell suggests not a balancing test like
Laycock's but a categorical approach: Courts should never command
free exercise exemptions that would make believers better off than they
would have been in the absence of the challenged government action.75 In
other words, a free exercise exemption should be denied if it would
advance religion at all, even if that advantage would be smaller than the
disadvantage created by the challenged government policy.
Whatever the relative merits of these two solutions, balancing and
categorical, they both acknowledge the problem of symmetry. However,
the critics do not fully appreciate the seriousness of that difficulty for
their core practical solutions. Two examples illustrate its import.
I. A current example: RLUIPA
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) illustrates how a symmetric application of substantive
neutrality contravenes some of the critics' deepest normative
commitments. 79
RLUIPA is the most recent salvo in a protracted battle between the
Supreme Court and Congress over the proper level of scrutiny for
burdens on religious freedom. For nearly thirty years before Smith, the
Court had applied strict scrutiny to burdens on free exercise under
Sherbert v. Verner.8° Smith abruptly ended that era and introduced a new
regime of rational basis review for the vast majority of free exercise
cases. Outraged by Smith, Congress reinstated the compelling interest
test-as a statutory matter-in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).' Congress thought it could prohibit both federal and state
governments from incidentally burdening religious practice. The
Supreme Court responded by ruling that Congress lacked power to enact
RFRA under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
accordingly it invalidated the statute as applied to the states. In
RLUIPA, Congress reinstated strict scrutiny, even against the states, but
no basis in substantive neutrality for the courts to second-guess the legislature.").
78. See McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1146-47; see also McConnell & Posner, supra
note 43, at 42 (suggesting that religious exemptions should not be granted when they advantage
believers over non-believers). McConnell, in his early article with Posner, at first purported to avoid
the symmetry problem by concerning himself only with a believer's choice whether to observe the
dictates of her given creed, not the choice among faiths. Somehow an exemption that removed an
obstacle to an believer's choice to worship would not violate the Establishment Clause simply because
it also advantaged that faith relative to other belief systems. See McConnell & Posner, supra note 43,
at 38 & n.81. It is unclear, however, why an exemption that encouraged conversion would not be
advantaging religion within the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Perhaps for this reason,
McConnell abandoned this approach and faced the problem of symmetry more squarely in later work.
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200occ to 2ooocc-5 (2003).
8o. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
81. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. §§ 200obb TO 200obb-4 (1993).
82. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (I997).
March 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
this time it relied on its Spending and Commerce Clause powers in the
limited contexts of prisons and certain land uses."3 For example,
RLUIPA's prison provision prevents government from substantially
burdening inmates' religious practice unless the state can demonstrate a
compelling interest and narrow tailoring.8
4
In Cutter, the Sixth Circuit held that RLUIPA violates the
Establishment Clause because it has the effect of advancing religion over
irreligion."s Imagine two white supremacist inmates, both of whom wish
to possess racist literature in violation of prison censorship rules. 8 One
inmate bases his bigotry on the teachings of the Church of Jesus Christ
Christian, Aryan Nation, while the other follows teachings of the Aryan
Nation, a secular group. The religious white supremacist would benefit
from strict scrutiny under RLUIPA, while the secular racist would
receive only rational basis review because speech claims do not draw
heightened scrutiny in the prison context.7
After considering that hypothetical, the Sixth Circuit ruled that
RLUIPA violates neutrality of effect because it advantages religion over
irreligion, "placing government] power behind one system of belief."
81
The Sixth Circuit figured that Congress had advanced religion over
comparable secular commitments, such as those protected by the Free
Speech Clause."' Only burdens on religious speech draw strict scrutiny
under RLUIPA, it reasoned, and therefore the expression of religious
commitments receives greater protection than the expression of secular
views grounded in, say, politics, philosophy, or aesthetics. Advantaging
religion in that way violates the Establishment Clause. 9° In our terms, the
83. For Judge Wilkinson's history of RLUIPA, see Madison v. Riter, 355 F-3 d 310, 314-15 (4th
Cir. 2003).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 200occ-I (2000).
85. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 266 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 308 (2004).
86. Id. at 266 (borrowing the hypothetical from Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 576 (W.D.
Va. 2003), rev'd., 355 F.3d 310 (4 th Cir. 2003)).
87. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-9o (1987) (considering only whether there is a "valid,
rational connection" between a prison policy and a "legitimate governmental interest") (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
88. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 266 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Would the Christian white
supremacist draw greater protection than the secular white supremacist under a liberty approach? Not
as a constitutional matter. Religion and speech both enjoy special status under the Constitution.
However, it may well be permissible for Congress to provide additional protection for religion alone in
the context of prisons and certain land uses. Doubtless Congress could do the same for speech if it
wished.
89. Id. ("[T]he primary effect of RLUIPA is not simply to accommodate the exercise of religion
by individual prisoners, but to advance religion generally by giving religious prisoners rights superior
to those of nonreligious prisoners.").
90. The Cutter court held that RLUIPA had the effect of conveying a "message of endorsement."
Id. It added that "RLUIPA also has the effect of encouraging prisoners to become religious in order to
enjoy greater rights." Id. The court declined to decide whether RLUIPA's purpose was neutral-that
is, whether the law was formally neutral-holding that even if it were neutral in this way, the statute
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Sixth Circuit overturned RLUIPA precisely because it contravenes
substantive neutrality.9'
The Fourth Circuit, ruling in a subsequent case, disagreed with
Cutter.92 There, Judge Wilkinson found that RLUIPA does not violate
the Establishment Clause because the Constitution cannot prohibit
Congressional exemptions whenever they somehow advantage religion
over comparable secular commitments.93 Any other result, Judge
Wilkinson wrote, "would work a profound change in the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and in the ability of
Congress to facilitate the free exercise of religion in this country."'
That outcome must be correct. Some 2,000 statutes-state and
federal-exempt religion from their provisions.9" It simply cannot be the
case that all those legislative accommodations are unconstitutional
whenever they incidentally advantage religion in some way. The Cutter
court's reasoning would undermine a longstanding tradition of legislative
accommodation of religion in the United States.
However, Judge Wilkinson was mistaken to think that RLUIPA
could be reconciled with substantive neutrality. He argued that
"RLUIPA in no way is attempting to... advance religion in general in
the prisons." 6 Although that may be true, it speaks to governmental
purpose, not effect. Tellingly, Judge Wilkinson never squarely faced the
Cutter court's central claim that RLUIPA advantages believers over
nonbelievers. He recognized the problem, but he responded not that
RLUIPA achieves a neutral effect, but instead simply that the
Establishment Clause cannot require "commensurate protections" for
religion and irreligionY "[T]he Constitution itself provides religious
exercise with special safeguards," he pointed out, but that protest was
nothing more than an objection to neutrality itself." Judge Wilkinson
should have upheld RLUIPA by arguing that neutrality of effect could
not be the right rule, despite the Lemon test. That reasoning would have
would still fall because it violated neutrality of effect. Id. at 264.
91. Recall that the Lemon test requires something close to substantive neutrality. A challenged
law must have a "principal or primary effect" that "neither advances nor inhibits religion." Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The Lemon test also requires a secular purpose, or formal
neutrality, and it prohibits state entanglement with religion. Id.
92. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310,318 (4 th Cir. 2003).
93. Id. at 318-19 ("The Establishment Clause's requirement of neutrality does not mandate that
when Congress relieves the burdens of regulation on one fundamental right, that it must similarly
reduce government burdens on all other rights.").
94. Id. at 320.
95. See Michael McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. I, 5 (2000)
[hereinafter McConnell, Singling Out] (citing James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, I445 (1992)).
96. Madison, 355 F.3d at 318.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 319.
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been truer to his intuitions, but it would have presented a problem for
the critics.
Surely the critics must agree that RLUIPA does not violate the
Establishment Clause. After all, it has much in common with their core
practical solutions. The critics are enthusiastic supporters of legislative
accommodations generally, of RFRA in particular," and presumably of
RLUIPA as well. However, the logic of their proposal, substantive
neutrality, would seem to dictate the result in Cutter-that RLUIPA is
unconstitutional because it impermissibly creates an effect that
advantages religion over comparable secular commitments. Symmetry
requires that outcome. Likewise, many legislative exemptions that are
designed to remove disproportionate burdens on religion will also
advantage religion and run afoul of substantive neutrality. That result
follows ineluctably from the symmetrical nature of neutrality--yet it
frustrates many of the critics' most crucial practical solutions.
2. Difficulties with Sherbert
The critics' leading precedent for applying strict scrutiny to laws of
general applicability, Sherbert v. Verner, also has the effect of
encouraging religion in violation of substantive neutrality." ° Critics of
Smith have not come to terms with the difficulty that symmetry poses for
that key authority. Sherbert concerned a Seventh-Day Adventist who was
denied unemployment benefits because she refused to work on Saturday,
her sabbath. Unemployment laws required applicants to accept "suitable
work," a condition that disqualified her because she refused to work
Saturdays. The Court carved out an exception for Sherbert and awarded
her benefits.'"' It is hard to justify that result under a rule of symmetric
substantive neutrality since the Sherbert ruling seems to advantage
Saturday sabbatarians.
The Court has virtually held as much. In Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, the Court struck down a statute that was difficult to distinguish
from the Sherbert exemption. ' Thornton involved a Connecticut statute
that allowed only sabbath-observant workers to choose their day off.
Workers with comparable secular reasons for selecting their day off were
99. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994); McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 95, at 4-5 (defending legislative
accommodations generally and RFRA in particular).
Ioo. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For a fuller discussion, see infra text accompanying
notes 43-53.
ioi. Id. at 410.
IO2. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985). Even before Thornton, Justice
Rehnquist suggested that neutrality of effect would prohibit the result in Sherbert. Rehnquist pointed
to establishment decisions holding that states may not pass laws that have the effect of advancing
belief, regardless of their purpose, and argued that the result in Sherbert and Thomas would violate
that rule by encouraging observance. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707,724-26 (598i) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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not accommodated by the law. Thus the Connecticut statute created a
situation virtually identical to the result ordered in Sherbert. But the
Court ruled that the Connecticut statute had the effect of advancing
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause."°
Justice Brennan later attempted to defend Sherbert in the face of
Thornton, arguing that the result in Sherbert "'reflect[ed] nothing more
than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences,"' while the Thornton law isolated a particular class of
believers for favorable treatment.' ° But it is difficult to understand how
the Sherbert exemption does not similarly favor unemployed members of
sabbatarian sects over unemployed secularists who would prefer to enjoy
state benefits until they found a job that did not require them to work on
Saturdays. The two exemptions differ in their purpose, but their effects
are much the same.
Justice Stevens also saw the problem and also tried to justify the
result in Sherbert. He distinguished between on the one hand a
hypothetical tax exemption for believers, under which "every citizen
would have an economic motivation to join the favored sects," and on
the other hand the exemption created in Sherbert, under which "[n]o
comparable economic motivation could explain the conduct of the
employees."'" For Stevens, a religious exemption for unemployed
Saturday sabbatarians therefore does not encourage religion in the same
way a tax exemption for all religious practitioners would.
But Stevens's distinction must be wrong. Although it is true that the
Sherbert exemption does not favor unemployed Seventh-Day Adventists
over non-believers generally, the way a tax exemption would, it does
103. Thornton, 472 U.S. at 71o n.9 ("Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but
non-religious, reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the statute."); Micahel J.
Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice, in ARTICLES OF FArrH, ARTICLES OF PEACE, 74,
89 (James Davidson Humger & Os Guinness, eds., 199o) (critiquing Thornton).
104. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 & n.I1 (1987) (quoting
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409).
105. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). In a subsequent
case similar to Sherbert, Stevens reasoned simply that the state's refusal to accommodate believers
evidenced a discriminatory purpose. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 147-48 (Stevens, J., concurring) (writing
that the state "regards [Hobbie's] religious claims less favorably than other claims" (internal quotation
marks omitted)). He did not say why the exemption still would not have the effect of
unconstitutionally encouraging religion-something his own reading of the Establishment Clause
prohibits.
io6. Justice Stevens' defense of Sherbert is all the more interesting because he supports a
substantive-neutrality approach to antiestablishment-that is, he believes that the Establishment
Clause should prohibit government policies that have the effect of advantaging religion. But Justice
Stevens' rule of substantive neutrality is not symmetric; he does not think it should apply to the Free
Exercise Clause. Government may burden religion, so long as that is not its object. Cf. Laycock,
Neutrality, supra note 27, at IoIo (noting that Stevens is a "judicial activist" on establishment issues,
but a "minimalist" regarding free exercise). This asymmetric approach to the religion clauses has won
few converts.
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favor them over non-believers who are similarly unemployed and who
have secular reasons for-preferring a job that does not require them to
work Saturdays."'° The problem of symmetry thus puts up a serious-but
so far unacknowledged-obstacle to Sherbert, a key precedent for the
critics.
C. THE PROBLEM OF BASELINES
Substantive neutrality also suffers from a commonly recognized
difficulty with neutrality rules generally, namely the problem of
baselines. Whenever the question is whether a government action has
effectively benefited religion, the answer will always depend on a
comparative perspective. Compared to what state of affairs must a
government policy have a neutral effect on religion?"' One candidate is
the status quo ante, i.e. the state of affairs before the challenged
government program was put into effect. But what guarantees that the
background government policies defining this ex ante situation were
neutral as to religion?"'9 How a court resolves the question of baselines
will largely determine whether it finds that a government exemption has
the effect of advancing religion or whether it concludes that the
accommodation, in Justice Brennan's words, "reflects nothing more than
the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences ....
RLUIPA illustrates the problem of baselines as well as the problem
of symmetry. Defending the law's neutrality, Judge Wilkinson wrote for
the Fourth Circuit that Congress had done nothing more than relieve
religious practitioners from government-imposed burdens on free
exercise in prisons."' The effect of RLUIPA, on this account, is neutral
107. In Smith, Justice Scalia tried to assimilate Sherbert to the rule of formal neutrality by arguing
that the unemployment board discriminated purposefully when it granted individualized exemptions
on secular grounds but refused to do so on religious grounds. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (i99o). But this revisionist history overrides the impressions of
the litigants and judges involved in Sherbert, none of whom found intentional discrimination. Justice
Brennan came the closest in the Sherbert opinion when he pointed out that the state exempts
Christians from working when textile plants operate on Sundays during times of national emergency.
Brennan thus argued that accommodating Christians, but not Sabbatarians, might have a
discriminatory effect, but he never suggested, as did the Smith Court, that there was any evidence in
Sherbert of discriminatory purpose. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406 (1963).
io8. See Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at Ioo5; McConnell & Posner, supra note 43, at 37.
io9. For prior critiques of the baseline problem for neutrality, see Larry Alexander, Liberalism,
Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 793 (1993); Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 6i NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311, 333 (1986); Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance,
78 CAL. L. REV. 305,319-21 (1990).
i ro. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409.
iii. See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Congress has simply lifted
government burdens on religious exercise and thereby facilitated free exercise of religion for those
who wish to practice their faiths.").
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because it merely restores believers to the position they would have been
in had the government not imposed prison regulations on them."2
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit in Cutter compared the effect of
RLUIPA not against the situation without prison regulations, but against
the ability of other inmates to pursue secular commitments inside
prison."3 After all, a wide range of activities, both secular and sacred, is
burdened by prison regulations. Measured against the ability to engage
in these other activities, RLUIPA has the effect of advantaging religious
practice. Whether government has acted to neutral effect thus depends
on the baseline of comparison.
The critics have all but admitted that neutrality cannot solve the
problem of baselines. For instance, they have acknowledged that
neutrality cannot ground the common intuition that religion should
receive basic police protection."4 Other government services, such as
public school facilities and unemployment benefits, similarly may or may
not deserve inclusion in a baseline of comparison."5 While neutrality
must always confront this problem of baselines without solving it, liberty
faces no such problem. 6 Liberty asks not whether a challenged program
is neutral relative to some baseline or another, but rather only whether
the state can afford to free religious groups from state-imposed burdens.
II. SUBSTANTIVE LIBERTY
This Part argues that a liberty component is necessary to any
attractive conception of free exercise. Liberty triggers neither the
problem of symmetry nor the problem of baselines. Although liberty
suffers from its own difficulties, these are preferable to the more serious
drawbacks of neutrality. Liberty also better comports with the critics'
own central intuition about free exercise -namely, that its principal
purpose is to protect the pursuit of conscience.
This is not to say that liberty should serve as the only free exercise
norm. Formal neutrality enjoys widespread acceptance; both supporters
and critics of Smith think that government should not purposefully
discriminate against religion. Again, this Article accepts that consensus.
Its central argument is that neutrality alone cannot sufficiently protect
freedom of conscience, and that a liberty component is necessary to any
112. Id. at 318-i9. "[N]eutrality does not mandate that when Congress relieves the burdens of
regulation on one fundamental right,... it must similarly reduce government burdens on all other
rights." Id.
113. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 308 (2004).
114. I take this example and the next from Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at 1005-o6.
115. See id. at lOO4-O6 (public schooling and the equal access controversy).
116. See id. at Ioo6 ("[Tihe principle of neutrality by itself is insufficient to define the baseline....
[t]he other principles of the religion clauses must be brought to bear."); McConnell & Posner, supra
note 43, at 38 ("Economics cannot tell us which of these baselines to choose.").
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attractive account of the Free Exercise Clause. Part I showed that the
critics' leading alternative to Smith-substantive neutrality-fails to
articulate a satisfactory conception of free exercise. This Part will argue
that a combination of formal neutrality and liberty better vindicates the
critics' own vision.
A liberty conception of free exercise holds that religion should be
free of substantial government hindrances, so long as its exercise does
not frustrate important state interests. Liberty trades on the same two
uncontroverted understandings of free exercise that Eisgruber and Sager
identify: first, people should not be punished or deprived of government
benefits on account of their beliefs, and second, "important aspects of
religious practice ... are largely beyond the reach of the collective
authority of the state."'"7 But these two tenets lead here to a different
lesson than the one extracted by Eisgruber and Sager. Liberty puts
religion beyond the power of the state not in the sense that government
must treat religion evenhandedly, but rather in the sense that the state
must refrain from burdening observance unnecessarily.
Courts should begin by asking the right question: whether the state
has improperly impeded religious practice. That question better tracks
the critics' most fundamental worry. Their concern is not that certain
government policies are not really neutral, once neutrality is properly
understood. Instead, their deepest anxiety is that laws will wrongly
burden religious liberty.
Consider an analogy to free speech. We find the law against flag
burning troubling not because it has a non-neutral effect, imposing a
greater burden on those who burn flags for political expression than on
those who burn them for light or heat. Rather, we are troubled (if we
are) because the law burdens expressive activity-because it contravenes
liberty." 8 In the case of religion, getting this distinction right matters, and
matters greatly, because of neutrality's problem of symmetry. We care
little whether exempting a particular form of political expression thereby
favors speech, but neutralists must care whether exempting free exercise
thereby favors it in a way that violates antiestablishment. Asking the
wrong question will lead to predictable restrictions on religion, as the last
Part demonstrated. And asking the right question reflects the affirmative
value of liberty of conscience.
In this Part, Section A describes and defends a particular type of
liberty principle, substantive liberty. Section B examines the actual
practice of lower courts and argues that substantive liberty better
comports with the intuitions of many federal judges. Lower court judges
I17. Eisgruber & Sager, Equal Regard, supra note 26, at 205.
18. This example is adapted from Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in
the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CU. L. REv. 1057, 1094 (99o).
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regularly exploit doctrinal loopholes in order to reach results that
circumvent the formal neutrality rule of Smith. Those results cannot be
explained by any sort of neutrality--instead, they make sense only under
a liberty account.
The next three sections anticipate criticisms. Section C
acknowledges the most common critique of a liberty approach to free
exercise, namely that it would require unprincipled judicial balancing. It
replies that similar balancing tests work in the context of other liberty
provisions without undue difficulty. Liberty's drawbacks, though non-
trivial, should be preferred to neutrality's. Section D argues against
critics who think that substantive neutrality effectively works to protect
liberty as a sort of side effect. On their account, substantive liberty would
be not so much wrong as unnecessary. Four examples show how
substantive liberty yields results that differ from substantive neutrality's.
Last, Section E defends substantive liberty against the objection that it
would likely violate the Establishment Clause. Although this Article
does not develop a theory of the Establishment Clause, it does suggest as
a preliminary matter that a substantive liberty rule for the Free Exercise
Clause would not contravene common understandings of
antiestablishment.
A. LIBERTY DEFINED AND DEFENDED
Liberty protects thought and conduct from government burden or
coercion, independent of any concern for evenhandedness-that is,
without comparison to other religions or to secularism.
Formal liberty protects against purposive coercion. For example, the
state laws in McDaniel v. Paty purposefully burdened liberty (as well as
neutrality) when they barred ministers from serving in certain state
offices."9
Contrasting formal liberty and formal neutrality is fairly easy.
Government might purposefully disfavor a religion without aiming to
burden the practice of that faith. In a recent example, the San Francisco
city government officially denounced a conservative Christian group for
its advertising campaign promoting the view that homosexuality is a sin.
City ordinances deplored the "Religious Right" and its ads for
"creat[ing] an atmosphere which validates oppression of gays and
lesbians ..... The Ninth Circuit held that even though "'targeting religious
beliefs as such is never permissible"' under Smith,' the Free Exercise
Clause should not prohibit state action that is "neither regulatory,
119. See section I.A.1 supra.
12o. Am. Family Ass'n, v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1119-2o (9th Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at I 123-24 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993)).
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proscriptive, or compulsory .... .San Francisco violated formal neutrality
without impeding formal liberty.
It is more difficult to imagine the reverse, a law that purposefully
restricted religious liberty in an evenhanded manner. The most obvious
candidate, a state prohibition of all sacred practice, would not qualify
because it would disfavor religion as a whole and thus violate neutrality
as between religion and non-religion. So while almost every conceivable
violation of formal liberty will also violate formal neutrality, the reverse
is not true-formal neutrality bans much state action that will not offend
formal liberty.
Substantive liberty protects against laws or policies that, although not
intended to compel or inhibit, nevertheless create an effect that
significantly burdens belief or practice. Controlled substance statutes, for
instance, substantially restrict Rastafarians' sacred use of marijuana even
though the drug laws were not designed to burden ritual practice.'23
Rastafarians would not likely receive an exemption under substantive
neutrality because of the problem of symmetry- accommodating
Rastafarians would advantage them in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Substantive liberty differs from substantive neutrality because it
would evaluate significant burdens on observance independently of
whether any exemption would favor religion.'
Now that they have been defined, the leading free exercise principles
might be depicted in the following way:
Formal neutrality Formal liberty
(purposive neutrality) (freedom from purposive
(the rule of Smith) burdens on religion)
Substantive neutrality Substantive liberty
S (neutrality of effect) (freedom from incidental
(the critics' proposal) burdens on religion)
In sum, formal neutrality, the rule of Smith, protects against
purposive discrimination, while substantive neutrality, the critics'
proposal, also prohibits government actions that have the effect of
122. Id. at 1124.
123. Another example is Yoder, where the Court found that a compulsory education law, although
neutral in purpose, nevertheless had the effect of preventing the Amish from adhering to their belief
that children should not be educated in the public schools after eighth grade. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
4o6 U.S. 205 (1972).
124. In one place, Justice Brennan articulated some such distinction: "Under the Constitution
there is only one relevant category-all faiths. Burdens placed on the free exercise rights of members
of one faith must be justified independently of burdens placed on the rights of members of another
religion." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,521-22 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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disadvantaging belief. Formal liberty, though purely hypothetical, would
guarantee against purposive state burdens on religion. And substantive
liberty, the contribution here, protects against government policies that
have the effect of burdening observance.
Here is how the proposal would work. Two principles properly
protect free exercise: formal neutrality and substantive liberty.
I. Formal neutrality
As noted above, there is a consensus today in favor of formal
neutrality, at least as a baseline of constitutional protection. Formal
neutrality would work here similarly to the way it does in Smith: any
purposive government discrimination against religion would receive
heightened scrutiny. For example, the Court rightly held in Lukumi that
certain ordinances violated formal neutrality because their object was to
prohibit the ritual sacrifice of animals by a particular religion, Santeria"'
Similarly, Congress could not declare "this is not a Muslim nation," even
if that proclamation carried no sanctions. Formal neutrality protects
against government disfavor regardless of burden. ,6
There is some question, however, whether formal neutrality should
be protected as strongly it is under Smith and Lukumi. The Court's most
recent free exercise case illustrates the problem with the compelling
interest test for formal neutrality.
In Locke v. Davey, the Court upheld a scholarship program
established by Washington state.'27 Joshua Davey won the scholarship,
which recognizes exceptional students who have limited income and who
plan to attend an accredited college in Washington. But when Davey
enrolled at a qualified school affiliated with the Assembly of God and
declared a major in theology with the intention of becoming a cleric, he
lost the scholarship. Washington expressly excluded from its scholarship
students majoring in devotional theology. 1 8 It justified that exclusion by
125. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 5o8 U.S. 520, 520 (1993). Applying
strict scrutiny, the Court failed to discern a compelling state interest and invalidated the ordinances.
Id. at 546-47.
126. Formal neutrality for free exercise differs in this way from content neutrality for free speech.
In the speech context, neutrality usually functions as a side constraint, kicking in only once some
government coercion has been shown. Government disfavor toward a particular viewpoint does not
generally violate the speech clause absent some coercion-after all, government disfavors views
whenever it takes positions on issues of the day. Once coercion exists, however, neutrality works as a
side constraint to exclude certain government justifications.
In the free exercise context, by contrast, a violation of formal neutrality is impermissible
regardless of whether the government policy burdens religion. For instance, a government
pronouncement that Islam is misguided would violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it coerced no
one.
127. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,725 (2004).
528. See WASH. REv. CODE § 28B.io.814 (1997) ("No aid shall be awarded to any student who is
pursuing a degree in theology."); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(02) (2004) ("'Eligible student'
means a person who:... (g) [ius not pursuing a degree in theology."). There was no debate between
March 2005]
HASTINGS LA W JOURNAL
arguing that it was necessary under its state constitution, which requires
an unusually strict separation of church and state.' 9 The Ninth Circuit
understandably held that strict scrutiny applied to the scholarship under
Smith and Lukumi because Washington's policy purposefully
discriminated against religion.'30 Finding no compelling interest, it ruled
for Davey and struck down the religion exclusion. Writing for the Court,
Justice Rehnquist reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and upheld the
Washington scholarship's exclusion despite Smith and Lukumi.'3 I
Assessing the holding in Davey is beyond the scope of this Article,
which concerns a different problem. Two observations are nevertheless
appropriate. First, it does seem odd to presume unconstitutional a
program that imposes only a small burden on Davey's ability to pursue a
theology degree.'32 After all, Davey was in fact able to continue his
education without the merit scholarship on the same terms as the vast
majority of other students.'33 Yet formal neutrality under Smith requires
just this presumption of unconstitutionality.
the parties that Davey was studying theology from a faith perspective.
129. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § iI ("No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment .... ").
130. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
131. Davey, 540 U.S. at 725.
132. See id. (noting that Washington's exclusion "places -a relatively minor burden on Promise
Scholars"); Id. at 720-21 ("In the present case, the State's disfavor of religion (if it can be called that)
is of a far milder kind. It imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or
rite. It does not deny to ministers the right to participate in the political affairs of the community. And
it does not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government
benefit." (citations omitted)); see also Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 24, at 214 ("The
unifying theme [of Davey] is that facial discrimination against religion is presumptively
unconstitutional if, and only if, the discrimination burdens a religious practice.").
133. Cases in the circuits likewise illustrate judicial discomfort with the strong rule of formal
neutrality articulated in Smith and Lukumi. In the San Francisco case mentioned above, the Ninth
Circuit considered a city ordinance that denounced a conservative Christian group for its homophobic
advertisement campaign. Am. Family Ass'n, v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 114, i 124
(9th Cir. 2002). The court held that the ordinance did not implicate the Free Exercise Clause because
the city's action was "non-regulatory" and "non-compulsory"-even though its denunciation of the
"religious right" violated formal neutrality. Id. Under Smith and Lukumi, the city's action should have
triggered strict scrutiny, but that standard did not comport with the Ninth Circuit's judgment.
Another Ninth Circuit panel similarly held that an Oregon regulation did not offend free exercise
even though it specifically prohibited the provision of on-site services to a disabled student because he
attended a religious school. KDM ex rel. WJM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3 d 1046 (9th Cir. 1999).
The court reasoned that free exercise had not been thwarted because the state had provided
equivalent services nearby and had even transported the student to and from the religious school. The
court found that even though "the regulation, standing alone, 'discriminates' against students in
religious schools," nevertheless in this case it did "not result in a burden on the free exercise of
religion." Id. at 1o51 (emphasis added).
These cases in the circuits suggest that the Supreme Court is not alone in feeling uncomfortable
with a rule that holds presumptively unconstitutional every government action that purposefully treats
religion differently.
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Second, Davey illustrates that although strict scrutiny might not be
the right standard, formal neutrality does capture a central norm of the
Free Exercise Clause, namely that government should not purposefully
single out religious practice for disfavor. To see this, imagine a program
exactly like Washington's except that it excluded only Jews or
Presbyterians. "4 Such an exclusion would contravene deep intuitions
about religious freedom. But it would not draw heightened scrutiny
under a liberty rule because it would burden students who were Jewish
or Presbyterian only to the same small degree as Washington's program
actually burdened Davey. This hypothetical suggests that formal
neutrality should survive as an independent free exercise principle.
The holding in Davey, approving Washington's purposeful exclusion
of religious students, raises the question of whether formal neutrality
ought to continue to draw strict scrutiny, as it does under Smith, or
whether some more nuanced approach would better fit the cases.'35
Rehnquist ducks the issue in Davey, leaving considerable tension
between Davey and Smith." 6 This Article does not attempt to resolve
that tension. Instead it simply accepts the current consensus that formal
neutrality provides a minimum baseline of constitutional protection
under the Free Exercise Clause.'37
2. Substantive liberty
Substantive liberty remedies the deficiencies of neutrality. Under
substantive liberty, even if a law did not purposefully discriminate
against religion, it would still implicate free exercise if it had the effect of
134. Cf. Oral Argument Transcript at 5o, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 72 (2004) (02.1315), 2003 WL
22955928 ("QUESTION: If it-if it-if it isn't coercion of-of his religion, I suppose it would be okay
to limit this-this exclusion to Jewish theology or to Catholic theology, because the response would be
it doesn't-it doesn't coerce his religion at all.").
135. Cf id. at 44-45 ("QUESTION: You-you don't know of any case that says that the less
significant the interest the state has is [sic] the more latitude it has in discriminating against religion.
You don't know of any case that said that? ... [ANSWER]: No. And hopefully this won't be that one.
(Laughter.)").
136. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority "opinion is devoid
of any mention of standard of review").
137. Some might wonder whether formal neutrality must be applied symmetrically, and if so
whether it too prohibits religious exemptions. It is true that formal neutrality, like all neutrality rules,
must be applied evenhandedly. Government cannot act with the purpose of advantaging secular over
sacred commitments. However, that symmetry constraint does not defeat religious exemptions. The
purpose of most congressional and judicial exemptions is not to advantage religion, but instead to
protect liberty by removing barriers to observance. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (holding that an exemption
enacted with "the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion" did not
violate the Establishment Clause). Other exemptions aim to remedy disadvantage. Cf. Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (noting that religious exemptions "reflect[] nothing more than the
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious difference[]") Either way, exemptions do
not purposefully advantage religion. They may well have the effect of favoring religion, but that effect
does not violate formal neutrality.
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burdening religious practice. Any substantial state burden on religious
practice would have to be justified by a sufficiently important state
interest.
Substantive liberty resembles the test that the Court applied under
Sherbert v. Verner. 38 That is, it applies heightened scrutiny to burdens on
free exercise. However, it modifies Sherbert in two significant respects in
order to make free exercise doctrine more workable.
First, heightened scrutiny here gets triggered only by substantial
burdens on religious activity.'39 This modification follows RFRA, where
Congress required strict scrutiny as a statutory matter but also adopted a
threshold requirement of substantiality.'4  The substantiality requirement
strikes a compromise that allows challenges to incidental burdens on free
exercise without opening the floodgates to suits of every conceivable
kind. 4' Substantiality might foreclose, for instance, challenges to
government actions that did not directly burden religious practice, but
that created only an indirect burden, meaning that they simply made
observance more difficult or costly.'42 A tax on peyote would impose a
direct burden on Native Americans, while an income tax that made
purchase of the sacrament more expensive would not. A substantiality
requirement might also filter out challenges to laws that leave open
alternate channels for observance.'4
3
Second, substantive liberty requires something less than strict
scrutiny of burdens on religious practice. Instead, it entails a version of
intermediate scrutiny that would require the government to show only
that it had an interest important enough to circumscribe religious
liberty.'" The Court seems to be growing increasingly receptive to
balancing tests that fall somewhere in between compelling interest and
rational basis. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court reasoned that homosexual
138. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; see Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 24, at 202 (calling
the rule of Sherbert "substantive liberty").
139. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, io9 HARV. L. REV. 1H75,
i2io-i9 (1996).
140. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 200obb(a)(3) (2003) (protecting
only against laws that "substantially burden religious exercise"). The Sherbert Court also seemed to
focus on "substantial burdens," though not in its articulation of the test itself. Compare Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 403 (articulating the test) with id. at 4o6 (applying strict scrutiny to the "substantial
infringement" of Sherbert's free exercise); see also Employment Div., of Dep't of Human Res. of Or.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (i99o) ("Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially
burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.") (emphasis
added).
141. See Dorf, supra note 139, at 1212-13.
142. Cf. id. at 1209-10 (suggesting a similar substantiality requirement for incidental burdens on
speech).
143. See id. at 1215 (making a similar point by analogy to free speech).
144. See McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1127-28 (advocating something less that strict
scrutiny for burdens on free exercise).
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sodomy laws had no "legitimate state interest" that could "justify [their]
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."'45 Similarly
here, it makes sense to simply ask whether the state has an interest
sufficient to justify a substantial burden on free exercise.
Both of these modifications learn from the Court's experience
applying Sherbert over nearly thirty years. During the period between
Sherbert and Smith, the Court articulated a rule of strict scrutiny while in
fact arriving at results that could only be explained by some lower
standard.' 6 Many critics agree with Justice Scalia that the Warren and
Burger Courts in fact applied something less than strict scrutiny."'
Moreover, many critics concede that the Court is right to shy away from
the compelling interest test, even though these same commentators take
issue with particular rulings of the Sherbert era.' The Court's highest
standard should not be implicated every time a general law interferes
with religious practice, however lightly or indirectly. A test that differs
from Sherbert-by (I) protecting only against substantial burdens, and
(2) requiring a lower level of scrutiny-would be more workable and
would better approximate common conceptions of free exercise than did
the compelling interest test.'49
Not only is substantive liberty workable, it is also attractive. Recall
the critics' two normative critiques of Smith. Free exercise can be
burdened just as readily by a law that does not aim to target religion as
by one that does.'50 Moreover, religious minorities will bear the brunt of
laws that implicitly enact majority values. Substantive neutrality fails to
address those two concerns because of the problem of symmetry.
Substantive liberty, by contrast, asks the right question of free exercise
t45. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
146. See McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1 127.
147. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (199o) (noting
that the Court's results have not conformed to strict scrutiny even where it has "purported to apply the
Sherbert test"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that the strict scrutiny standard articulated by the Court does not explain its
holdings particularly well and citing cases); see also McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1128
(discussing other critics who have advocated some form of intermediate scrutiny).
148. See McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1127 ("Even the Justices committed to the
doctrine of free exercise exemptions [from formally neutral laws] have in fact applied a far more
relaxed standard [than strict scrutiny] to these cases, and they were correct to do so. The 'compelling
interest' standard is a misnomer.").
149. Incidental burdens on speech are also protected with a version of intermediate scrutiny. See
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376-77 (1968).
150. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 893 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("A person who is
barred from engaging in religiously motivated conduct is barred from freely exercising his religion ....
[He is barred] regardless of whether the law prohibits the conduct only when engaged in for religious
reasons, only by members of that religion, or by all persons."); cf. Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against
Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. i, 1 to (1998) (arguing
that liberty in the free speech context is burdened just as readily by a law that prohibits noisemaking as
by one that targets speech).
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claims. What is worrisome about the formal neutrality rule of Smith is
not that it fails to detect whether a state law or policy is really neutral,
once neutrality is properly understood. The deepest concern about Smith
instead is that it allows the government to thwart observance even where
restricting religious liberty is unwarranted. In cases described in the next
section, courts have acted to relieve such unwarranted government
restrictions. Only a liberty component can adequately account for their
outcomes.
B. CIRCUMVENTING NEUTRALITY
One indication of what free exercise should protect is what it
actually does protect, especially when courts must work hard in order to
circumvent the rule of Smith and achieve the right outcomes in particular
cases. Lower federal courts have reached results in this way that cannot
be explained by any sort of neutrality. Their decisions only make sense as
enacting an implicit principle of substantive liberty.
For instance, one court reviewed a school dress policy that
prevented students from wearing rosaries as necklaces because gangs
were using the beads to signal membership.' There was no claim that
the no-rosary policy purposefully targeted Catholics or otherwise
violated formal neutrality. Nevertheless, the court in Chalifoux exempted
Catholics under an obscure exception to Smith, the hybridity doctrine.'52
The Smith Court had said that strict scrutiny would remain appropriate
in cases of hybridity, where free exercise and another constitutional right
were both implicated.'53 (Probably the Smith Court did this solely to
distinguish Yoder, an important precedent that otherwise seemed to
flatly contradict Smith's new rule of formal neutrality.'54) Applying the
hybridity exception, the Chalifoux court exempted Catholics from the
school dress code because wearing rosaries implicated both free exercise
and free expression.' 5
Formal neutrality cannot justify that ruling because the school acted
with a purpose that was neutral as to religion. But neither can
i5I. Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659,664 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
152. Id. at 671.
153. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
154. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1121. In
Yoder, the Court exempted Amish children from attending school after the eighth grade in violation of
their beliefs, despite a formally-neutral truancy law. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36. The Smith Court tried
to distinguish Yoder, a clear departure from formal neutrality, by saying that it involved a hybrid
combination of two rights, free exercise and the right to parent. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
155. Chalifoux, 976 F. Supp. at 671. It is tempting to object that cases decided under the hybridity
exception do not imply any particular view of free exercise at all because they can always be
understood to turn on the partner right (here, free speech). But this reading would drain the hybridity
doctrine of any content because it would mean that a hybrid right can always be fully accounted for by
the partner provision. In order to make sense, the hybridity rule must mean something for free
exercise.
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substantive neutrality. Doubtless many students who were not Catholic
might have liked to wear rosaries to school, whether as an aesthetic
choice, or as a political statement, or simply to flaunt a restrictive dress
code."6 Exempting only Catholics, but not students with comparable
secular reasons for wanting to wear a rosary, incentivized religion in
violation of substantive neutrality. Only substantive liberty can account
for the court's sense of the correct outcome in the rosary case.
A second example is Newark Lodge case discussed earlier. There,
the police department implemented a policy that required all officers to
shave their beards.'57 Muslim officers challenged the policy on the ground
that it prevented them from fulfilling a religious commandment."' The
court executed an end run around neutrality using another exception to
the rule of Smith, this one for cases where the government creates a
system of individualized assessments but then refuses to accommodate
religion. The Newark Lodge policy was facially neutral because it was
designed to foster uniformity and discipline in the department.'59
However, a letter from the police chief suggested that exemptions based
on medical conditions would be acceptable.' The Third Circuit ruled
that the existence of a single secular exemption rendered the policy a
system of individualized exemptions within the meaning of the Smith
exception.' 6' It therefore applied strict scrutiny and granted an exemption
156. Another hybridity case is similarly inexplicable by formal or substantive neutrality. The Third
Circuit found a hybrid right involving freedom of association where the Salvation Army sued to obtain
an exemption from a state boarding house statute for one of its rehabilitation centers. Salvation Army
v. Dep't of Community Affairs, 99 F.2d 183, 197, 201 (3d Cir. I99o).
157. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 17o F.3d 359, 360 (3d
Cir. 1g).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 366-67 (outlining the department's interests in the shaving policy). The court hinted
that the medical exemption evidenced discriminatory intent because it suggested that the department
"decid[ed] that secular motivations are more important than religious motivations." Id. at 365.
Whatever the meaning of this passage, it strains credulity to say that a single medical exemption
evidences an intent to discriminate against religion. More likely, the department valued health
concerns over a whole range of other interests, both secular and sacred.
i6o. Id. at 361. The department challenged the existence of a medical exemption in its reply brief
on appeal, presumably once it became clear that the court might apply the compelling interest test on
that basis. The court refused to entertain the challenge, both because of procedural waiver and
because of the police chief letter. See id. at 365 n.6.
161. The court ultimately found that the compelling interest test had not been satisfied and ruled
in favor of the officers. Id. at 366-67. Application of the Smith exception for individualized
assessments seems incorrect here because the police department's sole secular exemption seemed
categorical, not individualized. The individualized assessments exception is probably best understood
as a device for detecting discriminatory purpose. A government system that grants case-by-case
exemptions but refuses to accommodate religion may well be violating formal neutrality. But a single
secular exemption like the one in Newark Lodge hardly seems to indicate purposive discrimination.
The Third Circuit was more faithful to the Smith exception for individualized assessments when it
recently held that the town of Tenafly had allowed so many particular dispensations, both secular and
sacred, to its prohibition on the private use of city utility poles that its refusal to grant a similar
exemption for the creation of an eruv constituted discrimination against Orthodox Jews. See Tenafly
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from the shaving requirement for the Muslim officers. 
6
,
Here too, substantive neutrality cannot account for the result
because of the problem of symmetry: Exempting sacred beards, but not
secular ones, advantages religion in violation of neutrality. Liberty, by
contrast, explains the outcome. Probably the court thought that the
Muslim officers' liberty interest was so strong, and the department's
countervailing interest in uniformity so weak, that the officers should
prevail despite formal neutrality. 6, In other words, the result in Newark
Lodge is best explained by substantive liberty.'
64
Finally, the circuits have unanimously upheld the right of churches
to discriminate in hiring clergy even though civil rights statutes are
formally neutral as to religion.' For instance, the Roman Catholic
Church may refuse to ordain women as priests despite employment
discrimination laws like Title VII. Ministerial exemptions, as these have
come to be known, inexplicably persist after Smith even though the civil
rights statutes are not aimed at religion. What is more, ministerial
exemptions violate neutrality of effect because they advantage churches
over secular organizations that also would prefer to discriminate in
hiring. Neither formal nor substantive neutrality can explain the doctrine
of ministerial exemptions as well as an implicit liberty norm."
No reading better explains these results-Catholic rosaries, the
Newark police, and ministerial exemptions--than a conception of the
Free Exercise Clause that includes the substantive protection of liberty.'
67
Eruv Ass'n, v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3 d 144, 168 (3d Cir. 2002).
162. Newark Lodge, 17o F.3 d at 366-67.
163. See id. at 360 (describing the Muslim injunction to wear beards as a "commandment" and the
failure to do so a "major sin"); id. at 366-67 (outlining the weakness of the government interest in
uniformity).
164. Eisgruber and Sager have another interpretation of this case, one that is consistent with their
proposed free exercise principle, "equal regard." See supra text accompanying notes 55-65 (discussing
Eisgruber and Sager's reading of the Newark Lodge case).
165. See Alicia-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop, 320 F.3d 698, 702-04 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the Free Exercise Clause prohibited an employee's Title VII suit because she performed ministerial
functions for her church employer); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 804-
05 (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1302-05
(i ith Cir. 2ooo); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455,461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).
166. See Eisgruber & Sager, Equal Regard, supra note 26, at 206 (using the ministerial exemption
as an example of the "uncontroverted" view that "important religious practices have a distinct status in
our understanding of constitutional justice"); Berg, End of the Century, supra note 40, at 198-99
("[E]very court of appeals to consider the issue since Smith has reaffirmed virtually absolute
constitutional protection for clergy employment decisions .... The clergy exception permits courts to
protect a definable core of religious autonomy .. "). None of the rationales that courts offer for the
ministerial exemption after Smith grounds this doctrine in neutrality. See, e.g., Roman Catholic
Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3 d at 8oo-oi.
67. Cf. Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 24, at 203 ("Lukumi and the trend of lower
court opinions read Smith in a way that provides substantial protection to religious liberty.").
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In fact, substantive neutrality would have obstructed each of these
outcomes. That is a problem for the critics, who doubtless would have
supported them in practice. Substantive neutrality therefore stymies the
critics' own conception of what free exercise means. It also fails to
capture the affirmative value that courts are implementing when they
work hard to circumvent the rule of Smith. They are protecting liberty.
C. OBJECTIONS TO LIBERTY
Smith itself was directed largely against the liberty rule of the
previous era. To the Smith Court, neutrality seemed to offer an antidote
to the disorder of liberty.'9 Justice Scalia, the author of Smith, worried
that strict scrutiny of burdens on religion Was threatening the rule of
law.'69 Strict scrutiny seemed to give individuals the power to exempt
themselves from laws that burdened their religious beliefs-unless the
government could meet the high burden of showing that it had a
compelling interest.'7° Any idiosyncratic faith could challenge a law and
render it presumptively unconstitutional.' Judges could not adjudicate
these claims in any consistent manner because courts are ill equipped to
assess the centrality, strength, or plausibility of belief.7 ' Therefore, no
"principle of law or logic" could govern a court's effort to balance
religion against state interests.'73  Subjective, unprincipled judicial
decision making would result.'74 In Justice Scalia's view, "[a]ny society
adopting such a system would be courting anarchy."'75 Neutrality seemed
more objective because it apparently freed judges from assessing
whether a government interest was important enough to warrant a
liberty restriction.
168. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-82 (I99o).
169. See id. at 885.
170. Id. at 885-86.
171. Id. at 888-89.
172. Id. at 886-87.
173. Id. at 887.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 888. Michael McConnell confirms that this is the central complaint of Smith:
Virtually the entire theoretical argument of the Smith opinion is packed into this one
sentence:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at ii29 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 890); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Should Sex Equality Law Apply to Religious Institutions?, in SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS
MULTICULTLRALIsM BAD FOR WOMEN? 85 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) ("The best defense of the
Smith principle is that even if it protects religious liberty too little, it comes close to protecting
religious liberty enough-and it does so with the only principle that real-world institutions can apply
fairly and easily.").
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Certainly, substantive liberty does require balancing religious
interests against governmental ones., 6 And balancing requires judgment.
However, there are four good reasons why the costs of substantive
liberty are preferable to the problems with substantive neutrality.
First, balancing tests pervade constitutional law. Subjectivity has not
proven an insurmountable obstacle to balancing tests associated with
liberty provisions such as free speech and substantive due process.'77 Free
speech doctrine, for instance, asks courts to balance expressive interests
against public norms. Incidental burdens on speech are upheld only if
they further an important state interest. That rule enforces something
close to substantive liberty, and it does so using a balancing test.I"" Judges
also determine the importance of speech whenever they distinguish
between categories of expression based on their importance (think of
obscenity and non-obscenity).'79 And they necessarily assess the
importance of expression whenever they weigh it against state interests,
even where the law at issue targets expressive acts. Otherwise courts
would have to strike down every law that purposefully burdened
expression."
Admittedly, some commentators have argued that the speech clause
should be interpreted to protect only against intentional content
discrimination.' 8' They think that free speech, like free exercise, should
require only formal neutrality. The strongest argument against a
balancing test for the Free Speech Clause is similar to the argument of
Smith, namely that judges cannot objectively weigh the value of speech
176. Judgment is required not only in the balancing itself, but also in the preliminary inquiry into
whether the burden is substantial. See Doff, supra note 139, at 1216 ("The very concept of a
substantiality test implies a subjective weighing process.").
177. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (asking whether homosexual sodomy
laws were backed by a "legitimate state interest" that could "justify [their] intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1998) (holding that an
incidental burden on speech can by upheld only "if it furthers an important or substantial government
interests" and if it "is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest").
178. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (1998); Doff, supra note 139 at 1201-02 ("[I]ncidental
burdens [on speech] frequently arise that present at least a strong prima facie case for heightened
scrutiny.").
179. See Adler, supra note 15o, at 11o-ii.
[I]f it violates the First Amendment for courts to distinguish between the serious
nonexpressive wrongs and harms that justify prohibiting speech, and the less serious
nonexpressive wrongs and harms that do not, then a fortiori it should violate the First
Amendment for courts to distinguish between different categories of expression, say,
between obscene and non-obscene speech ....
Id.
18o. See id.
181. See Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free
Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 927, 930-31 (1993) (arguing that the Free Speech Clause does
not properly protect against incidental burdens on speech); id. at 932 (arguing that "the value of
speech cannot be balanced against the government's [non-expressive] interests in any way that is
principled and that respects the very freedom of thought that the First Amendment itself protects").
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against state interests in avoiding the non-expressive harms.s2 But
balancing tests have persisted in the speech context despite such
concerns; they have not been replaced with formal neutrality rules.
8
,
There is no reason to think that courts are any less able to apply a
balancing test to religion than to speech.' 84 Sacred and secular
commitments present similar challenges to a society that, on the one
hand, is committed to recognizing their importance but, on the other
hand, realizes that liberty-of thought, belief, and expression-should
sometimes yield to the public good.
Second, Justice Scalia did worry that religion is a particularly
inappropriate subject for judicial balancing. Of course, religious
practitioners do have an autonomy interest in deciding themselves
whether their beliefs count as a religion. And it may be inappropriate for
judges to assess the centrality and importance of sacred practices. But
actually judges rarely do this. Few cases require courts to determine that
a religious interest is not sufficiently important. In fact, it is difficult to
think of instances where the Court has rejected a free exercise claim on
the ground that the practice in question was insufficiently central or
important. In the vast majority of cases, judges examine the religion only
to determine what the claim is.
For example, the Supreme Court itself recently rejected a free
exercise claim without questioning the centrality or importance of
religious conviction. In Locke v. Davey, mentioned earlier, the Court
seemed to balance "[t]he State's interest in not funding the pursuit of
devotional degrees" against the "relatively minor burden" that the
exclusion placed on ministry students.' 86 It did not gainsay ministry
students' strong interest in training to become clerics."" Instead, the
Court determined that losing a small, elite scholarship would not
significantly hinder that interest.' Usually courts will be able to avoid
second-guessing religious claims.
Third, neutrality rules also risk requiring courts to assess the
strength of religious claims. Even Smith's rule of formal neutrality does
182. See Adler, supra note 15o, at iio-Ii. Justice Scalia thinks this analogy to free speech helps his
cause, and he urges that it would be just as improper for the Court "to determine the 'importance' of
ideas before applying the 'compelling interest' test in the free speech field." Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
183. See McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at I144 ("In most areas of constitutional law...
the majority of the Court does not hesitate to weigh the social importance of laws against their impact
on constitutional rights.").
184. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 200-OI 0977) (arguing that government
cannot prefer religious morality to non-religious morality).
185. Cf McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1150-53 (noting that rejecting Smith will not
result in unprincipled balancing in many cases).
186. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).
187. Id.
188. Id.
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this in two ways. First, it obliges courts to determine whether a particular
conviction is religious. Judges must assess the believer's basic claim that a
religion is involved. Second, Smith's rule requires judges to use a
balancing test for laws that intentionally discriminate against religion.'
89
Avoiding all balancing would require the Court to automatically
invalidate any law that targeted religion, regardless of whether the
government's interest was compelling. But that per se rule would be as
wrong for free exercise as it would be wrong for free speech.
Recall from the last Section that in practice many judges work hard
to circumvent Smith and to reach outcomes that cannot be justified
under any sort of neutrality rule.'" When judges do this, they necessarily
weigh the importance of religious practices against the government's
interest in enforcing the challenged law. Currently they conduct that
balancing covertly. Substantive liberty would bring to light what is
already happening in practice.
Not only formal neutrality, but also substantive neutrality requires
significant balancing. That must be true because laws cannot be invalid
per se whenever they have the effect of disadvantaging religion. Ritual
human sacrifice, for instance, is not automatically exempted from murder
laws simply because it is incidentally disadvantaged by them. Some
exercise of judgment is required.91 Substantive liberty therefore does not
entail an altogether different type of judicial balancing than the rule it is
designed to replace.
A final reason to tolerate the costs of substantive liberty is that
neutrality rules entail even greater difficulties, as Part I showed. The
problem of symmetry means that substantive neutrality cannot deliver
attractive results in concrete cases. It prevents courts from granting many
of the core exemptions that substantive neutrality is designed to
generate.
In sum, neutrality promises to provide a less subjective, more
principled basis for free exercise doctrine. That promise drove the
Court's argument in Smith. And admittedly substantive liberty does ask
courts to weigh free exercise claims against governmental interests. But
balancing tests are an accepted part of current doctrine for other liberty
provisions in constitutional law. Moreover, neutrality rules in fact involve
the exercise of far more subjective judgment than is commonly
189. One rationale for the Davey result is that Washington's interest in enforcing its state
antiestablishment rule was compelling enough to overcome its intentional exclusion of religious
students from its scholarship program. Id. at 722.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 151-167.
191. See Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at 1004 (acknowledging that substantive neutrality
"requires more judgment[]" than does formal neutrality); Laycock, Remnants, supra note 4, at 32-33
(recognizing that courts will have to assess the degree of burden on free exercise but saying "I think
they could handle it").
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recognized. And they entail considerable costs. Overall, then, critics of
Smith should prefer liberty's problems to neutrality's. Substantive liberty
offers a more attractive solution to the critics' problems with Smith than
does their own effort to refurbish neutrality.
D. LIBERTY AS A SIDE EFFECT?
Some neutralists may object that the difference between substantive
liberty and substantive neutrality, while perhaps correct conceptually, is
meaningless in practice because guaranteeing neutrality also effectively
shields liberty as a kind of side effect. 92 Admittedly, neutrality does
resonate with religious freedom because banning government bias also
often protects against coercion. To take our simple example, a law that
barred Catholics from saying mass would violate both neutrality and
liberty. Prohibiting the state from discriminating against Catholics in that
case would also effectively free Catholics from a burden on their right to
perform a rite. Because of this overlap, it is tempting to say that
neutrality also protects liberty incidentally.
Actually, however, substantive liberty is distinct from substantive
neutrality both as a conceptual matter and in many real cases.
Consequently, liberty can not be protected as a side effect of neutrality.
In fact, protecting neutrality alone will not only fail to guarantee liberty
in a significant number of cases, but it will also predictably work to
restrict free exercise in practice.
Notice first that substantive liberty does not differ from neutrality
only in the sense that it protects more. Sometimes it protects less.
Imagine a government temperance campaign-purely educational,
without prohibitions or sanctions-that promoted the view that drinking
alcohol is unhealthy and immoral under all circumstances. Such a
192. See, e.g., Berg, End of the Century, supra note 4o, at 191 (equating "religious liberty, or
freedom" with substantive neutrality); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the
Siren Song of Liberalism, 2o HOFSTRA L. REv. 245, 261 (i99I) (comparing religious liberty and
neutrality of effect); Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 27, at 1002 ("Government must be neutral so that
religious belief and practice can be free. The autonomy of religious belief and disbelief is maximized
when government encouragement and discouragement is minimized."); Laycock, Religious Liberty as
Liberty, supra note 15, at 319-20 (arguing that government coercion is best prevented by a rule of
substantive neutrality); William P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the
Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 193
(2ooo) ("[The Court's approach in Smith] sensibly furthers religious liberty interests."). On the Court,
Justice Souter seems to think that substantive neutrality will satisfy the concerns of the Smith
dissenters. But the Smith dissenters probably urged something closer to a liberty conception of the
clause. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 5o8 U.S. 520, 562-63 (1993)
("The four Justices who rejected the Smith rule ... read the Free Exercise Clause as embracing what I
have termed substantive neutrality. The enforcement of a law 'neutral on its face,' they said, may
'nonetheless offend the Free Exercise Clause's requirement for government neutrality if it unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion."') (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 896 (99o) (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.)) (alterations
omitted).
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campaign would disadvantage Catholics who use wine in communion,
thereby violating substantive neutrality. But it would not necessarily
burden them in a way that would contravene substantive liberty because
the government education campaign imposes no penalties.'93 Disfavoring
religion is not the same as burdening it.
But the main point here is that substantive liberty would prohibit
certain laws that substantive neutrality would not. The problem of
symmetry means that substantive neutrality is powerless to exempt
believers from laws that disadvantage them without first considering
whether such an exemption would advantage religion. Many believers
would therefore go unprotected under the critics' rule of substantive
neutrality. Substantive liberty, on the other hand, does not suffer from
the problem of symmetry. It asks solely whether the state can afford to
relieve burdens on religious practice consistent with important state
interests. So while substantive neutrality would pause before granting a
free exercise exemption in order to ask whether the exemption would
advantage religion, substantive liberty would require no such
consideration.
Four examples illustrate this difference:
First, substantive liberty would not demand the invalidation of
RLUIPA or prohibit exemptions like the ones it requires. In Cutter, a
case described in detail above, the Sixth Circuit held that carving out
exemptions for religious inmates under RLUIPA would have the effect
of advantaging religion over secular convictions in violation of
antiestablishment.'" Under substantive neutrality, Cutter surely must be
rightly decided. Symmetry demands that neutrality of effect apply
evenhandedly to the Establishment Clause and to the Free Exercise
Clause. But substantive liberty would be free to grant exemptions like
those demanded by RLUIPA without considering whether they would
advance religion over irreligion. In fact, liberty might well require many
RLUIPA-like accommodations as a constitutional matter (though
substantive liberty would involve a lower level of scrutiny). By
prohibiting accommodations that substantive liberty might require,
substantive neutrality might actually restrict free exercise.
Religious exemptions from the drug laws provide a second
illustration of how substantive neutrality would not protect liberty as a
side effect. Substantive neutrality would reject outright certain claims for
193. This hypothetical temperance campaign probably would not have the effect of making
Catholics feel like outsiders in the political community because the campaign was not aimed at
religion.
194. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267 (2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 308 (2004). Of course
Cutter concerns the Establishment Clause, not the Free Exercise Clause. But the point remains that
substantive neutrality must confront the Establishment Clause, whereas substantive liberty could grant
RLUIPA-like exemptions without considering the Establishment Clause in the same way.
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accommodation from the drug laws. For instance, Rastafarians would not
be protected under substantive neutrality. An exemption would
advantage Rastafarianism relative to secularism because there is a strong
secular market for marijuana. (Similarly, exempting only the liturgical
use of wine during prohibition might have run into the problem of
symmetry.95 ) Peyote, by contrast, causes nausea and other unpleasant
side effects and consequently has generated virtually no secular
market.' People generally do not use peyote except for religious
purposes. Therefore, exempting the ritual use of peyote from the drug
laws would not substantially advantage Native American sects from the
standpoint of neutrality. Substantive liberty, however, would consider
Rastafarian and Native American claims for exemptions from the drug
laws using the same test. In both cases it would simply ask whether the
state had a strong enough interest in prohibiting the ritual use of drugs.
The results might differ for the two faiths--for instance if the state had a
greater interest in regulating marijuana than peyote--but that difference
would not be dictated by symmetry.
Third, imagine a hypothetical municipal park that admits only town
residents on the theory that only those who pay local taxes should enjoy
the park because it is maintained by the town fisc.' 9 So structured, the
ordinance does not violate formal liberty because it does not aim to
burden religion. It is also formally neutral because its purpose is neither
to favor nor disfavor an obscure creed. So far liberty and neutrality are
working in tandem.
Now suppose a group of nonresident nature worshippers wishes to
perform rituals in the park because of some special spiritual significance
to that place-say, a divine tree. Assume that the park is particularly
beautiful and many nonresidents would like to enjoy it. In that case,
sacred interests would dovetail with secular interests. Accommodating
only tree worshippers under those circumstances would incentivize the
park lover's religion. That would trigger the problem of symmetry. Park
worshippers would lose under substantive neutraty.'
195. Such an exemption did in fact exist for Christian communion. See National Prohibition Act,
ch. 85, Title II, § 6, 41 Stat. 305, 311 (i919). However, the small quantities of wine used at communion
probably would not have lured many wine lovers to the faith.
196. See H.R. REP. No. 103-675, at 7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404, 2409 ("There is
virtually no illegal trafficking in peyote-Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) data indicates
that between 198o and 1987, only 19.4 pounds of peyote was confiscated, while during the same period
the DEA seized over 15 million pounds of marijuana."); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 917-i8 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (distinguishing between marijuana and peyote).
197. These facts are adapted from Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 Conn. A.2d 552 (2ooi).
i98. Park worshippers would likely lose regardless of how the symmetry difficulty is handled.
Under McConnell's categorical approach, any advantaging effect would defeat the free exercise claim.
See supra text accompanying note 43. Even under Laycock's balancing test the tree devotees would
lose, assuming any exemption would advantage tree worship more than the current policy
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By contrast, substantive liberty would require the court to consider
only whether a significant burden on tree rituals could be accommodated
consistently with important state interests."9 It would not consider
whether an exemption would advantage tree worship. Of course, a court
could evaluate the probability of fraud." But the court would not
consider evenhandedness, and the tree worshippers would likely win
because accommodating a small number of idiosyncratic zealots would
cost the town so little.
Fourth and finally, the Court's Sabbath cases likewise demonstrate
how substantive neutrality would not protect liberty as a side effect.
Consider Braunfeld, where the Court rejected a challenge by Orthodox
Jewish shop owners to a Sunday closing law.'O They had claimed that the
law imposed disproportionate costs on people who observed the sabbath
on Saturday because they were forced to close their businesses on two
days per week instead of one.02 Substantive neutrality would have denied
their claim because an exemption would have favored Jews by giving
them a huge competitive advantage over storeowners who could not
open on Sundays." And in fact the Braunfeld Court did reason in part
that an exemption would have created an incentive for secular merchants
to claim a sacred duty to close on Saturdays24
To similar effect is Thornton, where the Court invalidated a
Connecticut statute that protected all employees from working more
than six days per week but gave only sabbath observers the power to
choose their day of rest.0  The Court ruled that the Connecticut statute
had the effect of advancing observance in violation of the Establishment
disadvantages it. See supra text accompanying note 44.
199. Provisos like this one were common in early state constitutions. See Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, io3 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1461-
62 (I990) (discussing early state free exercise clauses); McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 4, at 1117-
I8 (same).
2oo. See Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob Jones
University v. United States, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv. i, 20-30 (considering the effects of incentives to
fabricate religious belief on the outcomes of Supreme Court cases).
2oi. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (i96i).
202. Id. at 6oI-o2.
203. Id. at 6o8-o9 ("To allow only people who rest on a day other than Sunday to keep their
businesses open on that day might well provide these people with an economic advantage over their
competitors who must remain closed on that day; this might cause the Sunday-observers to complain
that their religions are being discriminated against.").
204. An exemption would create a "temptation for some, in order to keep their businesses open on
Sunday, to assert that they have religious convictions which compel them to close their businesses on
what had formerly been their least profitable day." Id. at 6o9. The Court seems to be thinking here of
fraud, but arguably an exemption would have created an incentive effect in favor of honest Saturday
sabbatarianism as well. That incentive might have affected decisionmaking at the margins-not only
among people who are sincerely considering conversion, but also among lapsed Jews who might feel
an incentive to become observant.
205. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703,710-I (I985).
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Clause.26 And indeed the Connecticut statute did advantage sabbatarians
over others who wished to take Saturday off for secular reasons. 7
Thornton was an antiestablishment case, but it has implications for our
problem. Substantive liberty would consider free exercise exemptions for
sabbatarians without engaging in the Thornton calculus. Instead it would
simply consider whether any substantial burden on observance could be
lifted consistent with state interests.
In sum, liberty works differently from neutrality in practice and it
cannot be protected incidentally, as a mere side effect20 Substantive
neutrality would prohibit some non-coercive government actions that
substantive liberty would not, such as the alcohol abstinence campaign.
And substantive neutrality, applied symmetrically, could not grant
certain exemptions that substantive liberty would. These four
examples- Cutter, the drug laws, the park worshipper hypothetical, and
the sabbath cases-illustrate how substantive neutrality presents an
analytic consideration, symmetry, that does not trouble substantive
liberty.
Liberty asks in the first instance only whether government action
substantially burdens the free exercise of religion, and if so whether a
magnanimous state could not protect ritual observance consistent with
the liberty of others and public peace. That is a meaningfully different
analysis with real practical yield.
E. Two LIMITS TO THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT
This Article limits its scope in two ways. First, it defends a liberty
conception of the Free Exercise Clause but does not develop a
corresponding theory of the Establishment Clause. Second, it addresses
the constitutional protection of religion alone, leaving aside the question
of whether similar protection should be extended to deeply held secular
commitments.
The first limit leaves the Establishment Clause for another day.
Some might object that circumscribing the argument in this way
artificially insulates it from the criticism that substantive liberty too will
predictably run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Admittedly, a strong
liberty principle will result in exemptions from formally neutral laws, and
those exemptions may well encourage belief relative to similarly situated
disbelief. If the Establishment Clause were to include an independent
2o6. Id.
207. Id. at 71O; see also id. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("All employees, regardless of their
religious orientation, would value the benefit which the statute bestows on Sabbath observers .... ).
2o8. Laycock seems to acknowledge this difference in one place, where he contrasts free exercise,
which requires neutrality, with the right to an abortion, which protects liberty. See Laycock, Theology
Scholarships, supra note 24, at 177 ("The right to choose an abortion is a right to be free of undue
burdens; the right to religious liberty is a right to government neutrality.").
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principle of substantive neutrality-such that it prohibited any
government policy that had an effect of encouraging religion-then
antiestablishment might well frustrate certain applications of a liberty
conception of free exercise.2" For example, accommodating Muslim
police officers in Newark will advantage Islam regardless of whether that
exemption is granted under substantive neutrality or substantive liberty.
And the Lemon test purports to prohibit laws that have the primary
effect of advancing religion."' That aspect of the Lemon test would
present a problem for substantive liberty if it were applied consistently.
But in actual practice it is not. A preliminary look suggests that the
Establishment Clause does not in fact require substantive neutrality.
Both theory and practice suggest this conclusion. In theory, first,
antiestablishment does not present the same type of inherent difficulty
for liberty as it does for neutrality. Symmetry is intrinsic, to neutrality's
very structure because neutrality speaks to both sides of a dispute in the
same breath. Every version of neutrality must apply evenhandedly."' For
example, protecting Orthodox Jews from the economic effects of the
Sunday closing laws would have removed a cost to observing the sabbath
on Saturday, but it would also have given Jewish merchants an even
larger economic advantage over their competitors."2 Such an effect could
not be called neutral.
By contrast, a liberty conception of free exercise does not carry any
inherent implication for laws that benefit religion. Differently put,
nothing in substantive liberty requires a substantive neutrality
conception of antiestablishment. The question remains whether
substantive neutrality might offer an independently attractive theory of
antiestablishment. A preliminary look suggests not. Recent scholarship
has argued that the Establishment Clause too should be understood to
protect liberty."3 If that is correct, then the Establishment Clause may
present no bar to a substantive liberty view of free exercise in theory.
In practice, second, the Establishment Clause leaves ample room for
a substantive liberty conception of free exercise. Courts simply do not
require strict neutrality of effect. Certain statutes and judicial decisions
implement something similar to substantive liberty-without raising a
209. Current law still does prohibit government policies that have the "primary effect" of
advancing religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). But that rule seems to be fading
in favor of a consistent principle of formal neutrality for both clauses. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639, 668-7o (2002) (O'Conner, J., concurring).
21o. Lemon, 4o3 U.S. at 612.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68 (arguing that neutrality is inherently symmetrical).
212. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6o8-o9 (I96I).
213. Noah Feldman, for instance, thinks that equality does not provide an attractive principle for
the Establishment Clause. See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.Y.U. L. REv. 346 (2oo2); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REv. 673 (2002).
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widespread concern that they constitute establishments.
The best example is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), which protects a strong version of substantive liberty.214 Recall
that Congress passed RFRA in 1993 in order to counteract Smith and
restore the compelling interest test, if only as a statutory matter.
215
Accordingly, RFRA requires the government to show a compelling
interest and narrow tailoring whenever government laws or policies
effect a "substantial[] burden" on religious practice."' That formula
protects a strong version of substantive liberty.2 7
What makes the example so apt is that RFRA may well create
effects that advantage religion relative to secular commitments across a
range of federal law. And yet there has been no common complaint that
RFRA violates the Establishment Clause, even though the statute has
been successfully attacked on other constitutional grounds. No circuit
court that has considered the question has held that RFRA violates
antiestablishment. 9 On the Court, only Justice Stevens has argued
otherwise. In City of Boerne v. Flores, where the Court held that
Congress lacked power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
to enact RFRA against the states, Justice Stevens argued in two short
paragraphs that RFRA also violates the Establishment Clause.2 Other
Justices have indicated that legislative exemptions for religion pose no
constitutional difficulty.2 ' And the vast majority of commentators thinks
that RFRA does not constitute an establishment of religion.2 Only a few
writers have questioned RFRA on establishment grounds, and they have
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb (1993). t
215. See § 2ooobb (articulating the purpose of RFRA as restoring the compelling interest test in
the wake of Smith); S. REP. No. 103-111, at 2 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893 (same).
216. See § 2ooobb-I(b).
217. This Article does not recommend, however, strict scrutiny for free exercise. There is a broad
scholarly consensus that the Court's free exercise cases under the compelling interest test of Sherbert
did not in fact implement so strict a test. Instead, this Article suggests that substantive liberty would
relieve a substantial burden on religious freedom unless the government could show that it had an
interest that was important enough to override the free exercise right. See supra text accompanying
notes 138-150.
218. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (holding that Congress lacks power
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass RFRA as against the states).
219. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1530 (9 th Cir. 1997); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3 d
Ioi8, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455,469-70 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Flores v.
City of Boerne, 73 F.3 d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 57 (997);
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854,862-63 (8th Cir. 1998).
220. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Tihe statute has provided
the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain.").
221. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 905-07 (1990)
(O'Conner, J., concurring) (approving of statutory exemptions for sacramental peyote use); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state could carve out an
exemption like the one the Court created in School District of Abington Township v. Schemp, 372 U.S.
203, 222 (z963), without running afoul of the Establishment Clause).
222. See, e.g., McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 95.
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not carried the day.223
After RFRA was hobbled in Boerne, Congress passed RLUIPA,
which reestablished strict scrutiny in the context of prisons and certain
land uses. 24 Three circuit courts have found no establishment flaw with
RLUIPA 25 Now the Sixth Circuit has gone the other way and held in
Cutter that RLUIPA advantages religion, as discussed above. Although
the decision provides some basis for thinking that a liberty rule for free
exercise might contravene the Establishment Clause in some cases, it
remains a minority view that will likely fail to carry the Supreme Court.
On balance, these two examples-RFRA and RLUIPA-suggest, at
least as a preliminary matter, that the prevailing constitutional
understandings of the Establishment Clause will pose no bar to a free
exercise rule of substantive liberty.
Many other statutes likewise single out religion for special solicitude
in the context of particular provisions. Some 2,000 statutes in the U.S.
exempt religion from their provisions. 7 Although the Supreme Court
has not upheld every such exemption, "' it has never suggested that a
legislative exemption would be unconstitutional simply because it
advanced religion in some way-that is, on the ground that it violated
neutrality of effect. 29 On the contrary, the Court has said that "[w]here,
as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation
that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the
223. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,
Period, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. I, 9-14 (1998); William J. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: Establishment, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 227, 237-42 (1995).
Even Eisgruber and Sager, who advocate an "equal regard" view of the religion clauses, do not argue
decisively that RFRA violates the Establishment Clause. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1308 (1994) (noting that RFRA "may itself be unconstitutional under the equal
regard standard").
224. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No IO6-274, 114 Stat.
803 (2000).
225. See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2003); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 6oi, 611
(7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F. 3d IO62, io68 (9th Cir. 2002). But see Ghashiyah v.
Dep't of Corr., 250 F. Supp. 2d IOi6, 1025 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (holding that RLUIPA violates the
Establishment Clause); Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566,581-82 (W.D. Va. 2003) (same).
226. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3 d 257, 266-67 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 308 (2004);
see supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
227. See McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 95, at 5 (citing James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1445 (1992)).
228. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703,710-I (1985) (striking down a state law
that limited the work week to six days, but allowed only Sabbath observers to choose their day off);
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. I, 25 (1989) (invalidating a tax exemption for religious
publications).
229. See McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 95, at 2 (noting that courts and most scholars have
assumed "that exemptions for religious activity are legitimate; the debate is over whether they should
be constitutionally required").
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exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities. '7 3 °
No one would argue, for example, that allowing Roman Catholics to
use wine in religious ceremonies during prohibition constituted an
impermissible establishment, even though it advantaged that church
relative to others who wished to use wine in secular ceremonies.23'
Similarly, ministerial exemptions from employment antidiscrimination
laws are not commonly condemned under the Establishment Clause,
though they are controversial on other grounds. 3 ' To date, only isolated
voices among judges and commentators have questioned legislative
immunities for religion. 33 Antiestablishment in the U.S. does not bar all
government actions that benefit religion incidentally.
In sum, substantive liberty entails no intrinsic understanding of the
Establishment Clause in theory. And in practice, statutory exemptions
that bear a close resemblance to what judges might award under
substantive liberty enjoy widespread support in the U.S. constitutional
tradition.
The second way in which this Article limits its scope is by addressing
religion alone. It defers the question of whether similar constitutional
protection should extend to deeply held secular convictions grounded in,
say, morals, politics, philosophy, or aesthetics. Although substantive
liberty for religion seems attractive, it may be arbitrary to deny similar
protection to strong secular beliefs. Advocating evenhandedness among
secular and sacred commitments is probably the most appealing aspect of
work by Eisgruber and Sager. Their work captures a contemporary
conviction that the Constitution should not privilege religion over other
forms of modern conscience. 34 Nothing inherent in substantive liberty
prevents such an expansive conception, although marrying the two
230. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 338 (1987). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 22o-21 (1972) ("The Court must not
ignore the danger that an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may
run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no
matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise."); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) ("We cannot read New York's [tax exemption] statute as
attempting to establish religion; it is simply sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of
property taxation levied on private profit institutions.").
231. See National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, Title II, § 6, 41 Stat. at 311 (1919). This argument
brackets for the moment the Equal Protection Clause.
232. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336-40 (upholding Title VlI's exemption for churches which
discriminate on the basis of religion, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-i ); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553,
56o-6i (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding an implied statutory exemption that permits churches to
discriminate on the basis of sex in some circumstances).
233. See McConnell, Singing Out, supra note 95, at 6-7 (including Justice Stevens among the
opponents of legislative exemptions); ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS
CoN sTrTnoN: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 26 (1996); see also Tushnet, supra note 30.
234. See Eisgruber & Sager, Equal Regard, supra note 26, at 205 ("Our freedom of belief extends
to political, aesthetic, and moral matters, to matters that are religious and antireligious.").
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approaches would raise qualitatively different concerns.
In any case, a separate body of scholarship addresses the question of
religion's uniqueness.235 That literature is beyond the scope of this
Article, whose argument is considerably narrower-only that the critics'
own concern for free exercise cannot be fully vindicated by their rule of
substantive neutrality. Whether substantive liberty should protect
religion alone, or also similarly deep secular convictions, is a question
that must be left for future work.
CONCLUSION
Neutrality alone cannot provide an attractive conception of the Free
Exercise Clause. Formal neutrality captures an important intuition,
namely that government should not be allowed to purposefully
discriminate against religion. However, the critics argue correctly that
formal neutrality is insufficient. Laws can burden religious practice even
if that is not their purpose. Many state regulations will unwittingly
interfere with observance in ways that can be devastating. These
regulations will often implicitly enact majority values that burden
minority sects. For these reasons, the critics have waged an influential
campaign against the Court's current rule of formal neutrality.
Yet the critics' proposal, substantive neutrality, suffers from a
conceptual difficulty, the problem of symmetry, that frustrates many of
their most important practical proposals. Substantive liberty offers a
more attractive conception of the Free Exercise Clause. Government
should ask the right question of claims when faced with free exercise
claims: not simply whether the challenged 'polices are neutral, once
neutrality is properly understood, but rather whether the state should be
able to burden liberty of conscience. A benevolent modern state,
recognizing the importance of religious freedom in its Constitution,
should embrace and protect liberty.
235. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, Is Religious Identity Special?, in IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 151-91
(2003).
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